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AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE 
COURTS: A NEW JURISPRUDENCE OR BUSINESS AS USUAL? 
David Markell* & J.B. Ruhl† 
Abstract 
While legal scholarship seeking to assess the impact of litigation on 
the direction of climate change policy is abundant and growing in leaps 
and bounds, to date it has relied on and examined only small, isolated 
pieces of the vast litigation landscape. Without a complete picture of 
what has and has not been within the sweep of climate change litigation, 
it is difficult to offer a robust evaluation of the past, present, and future 
of climate change jurisprudence. Based on a comprehensive empirical 
study of the status of all (201) climate change litigation matters filed 
through 2010, this Article is the first to fill those gaps and assess the 
state of play of climate change in the courts. It concludes that the story 
of climate change in the courts has not been one of courts forging a new 
jurisprudence, but rather one of judicial business as usual. 
Part I of the Article outlines the scope of climate change litigation, 
explaining what qualifies as climate change litigation in our study, our 
methodology for identifying and coding case attributes, and our 
typology of the claims that have been or likely will be made as climate 
change moves relentlessly forward. Part II then presents and assesses 
the major theme revealed from our empirical study and largely missing 
from commentary on climate change litigation—that a siege-like battle 
between “pro” and “anti” regulation interests has led to an increasingly 
robust and complex litigation landscape but with mixed results for both 
sides. Drawing from those findings, Part III takes on a set of empirical 
and normative questions designed to summarize and assess the climate 
change litigation experience and its impacts on the content and 
institutions of climate policy. It is evident at all levels of inquiry that 
courts have taken a “business as usual” approach to climate change, 
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resisting litigants’ attempts to make courts a locus of direct 
policymaking, but courts nevertheless have influenced the policy 
content and its institutional contours dramatically. We extract these 
themes from the full experience of climate change litigation and suggest 
fruitful paths of research to develop a better understanding of the role 
and impact of the courts in the climate change policy arena. Part IV then 
stretches a bit from the confines of our empirical study and findings to 
speculate about the future of climate change litigation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is a truism by now that climate change is one of the central public 
policy issues of our time.1 Yet while legal scholarship seeking to assess 
the impact of climate change litigation on the direction of policy in this 
important arena is abundant and growing in leaps and bounds,2 to date it 
has relied on and examined only small, isolated pieces of the vast 
litigation landscape. With few exceptions, most legal scholars have 
focused on the obvious, such as the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA,3 and the sexy, such as the small handful (thus 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Press Release, Obama Press Office, Obama Statement on Climate Change 
Negotiations in Bali (Dec. 10, 2007), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=90947 
(describing climate change as “one of the greatest challenges of this generation”). 
 2. Westlaw searches conducted on November 6, 2011 in the Journals and Law Reviews 
(JLR) library for the phrase “‘climate change’ /s litigation” and using different date restrictions 
yielded a list of 5 articles through 2000, 34 articles through 2005, 615 articles through 2010, and 
727 articles through the November 2011 search date.  
 3. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). A majority of the Court found that the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) had erred in denying a citizen rulemaking petition to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions from motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act. Id. at 534. The opinion opens with the 
pronouncement that “[a] well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided with a 
significant increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Respected 
scientists believe the two trends are related.” Id. at 504–05. Although as a matter of judicial 
restraint the Court was silent on whether and how EPA might go about regulating emissions, the 
opinion seems to have been crafted to nudge the Agency toward regulation, or at least make it 
difficult for the Agency not to regulate. See infra note 17; see also Jonathan Z. Cannon, The 
Significance of Massachusetts v. EPA, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 53, 59 (2007) (“The Court’s 
opinion seems to leave EPA little room in dealing with climate change.”); Arnold W. Reitze Jr., 
Controlling Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Mobile Sources—Massachusetts v. EPA, 37 
3
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far) of high-profile cases alleging that the sources of greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions are liable under public nuisance and other common 
law doctrines.4 Surely these are important legal developments worthy of 
                                                                                                                     
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,535, 10,538 (2007) (“[T]he Court’s opinion pushes EPA to find that GHGs 
need to be regulated.”). Indeed, EPA has since promulgated a series of GHG emission 
regulations. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71); Light-Duty 
Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; 
Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600, and 
49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536, 537, 538); Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations that 
Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 
(Apr. 2, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 51, 70, 71); Endangerment and Cause or 
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I). See generally ROBERT MELTZ, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41103, FEDERAL AGENCY ACTIONS FOLLOWING THE SUPREME 
COURT’S CLIMATE CHANGE DECISION: A CHRONOLOGY (2011), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41103.pdf; U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Climate Change—
Regulatory Initiatives, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/initiatives/index.html (last 
visited Nov. , 2011). Commentators generally regard Massachusetts v. EPA as a watershed 
event in climate change litigation, if not also for environmental law generally. See Cannon, 
supra, at 61 (stating that “the broader cultural or symbolic significance of the decision [is that 
t]he Court has accepted—indeed has seemed to internalize—the beliefs, assumptions, and 
values that animate the environmentalists’ views on climate change”); Richard Lazarus, A 
Breathtaking Result for Greens, ENVTL. F., May–June 2007, at 12 (describing the case as “[a] 
breathtaking result for environmentalists” and “[t]he first time that environmentalists have both 
persuaded the Supreme Court to grant review over the federal government’s opposition and then 
won on the merits”).  
 4. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859–60 (5th Cir. 2009) (reversing 
lower court’s granting of motion to dismiss), vacated, 607 F.3d 1049, 1055 (2010) (restoring 
trial court’s dismissal); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 314–15 (2d. Cir. 
2009) (reversing lower court’s granting of motion to dismiss), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 
(2011) (holding the federal common law claims preempted because “the Environmental 
Protection Agency action the Act authorizes . . . displace[s] the claims the plaintiffs seek to 
pursue,” but leaving open the question of any preemption of state law claims); Native Village of 
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (granting motion to 
dismiss); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *1–2, 
*16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (granting motion to dismiss). Notwithstanding the fact that no 
such case has yet resulted in success on the merits, legal scholarship on the mere idea of this 
form of litigation is already legion. See Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About 
Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 2 n.3, 4 (2011) (collecting articles and arguing that the cases are 
unlikely to succeed). Legal practitioners have cast the line of cases as portending a major new 
thrust of common law liability. See, e.g., Robert A. Wyman et al., Significant Climate Issues 
Likely to Be Raised in the Federal Courts, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,925, 10,926 (2009) (suggesting 
that judicial decisions “may have a powerful impact on public policy” in the climate change 
arena); Douglas J. Feichtner & Kevin P. Braig, Global Warming Litigation and the Ghost of 
Mrs. Palsgraf—Why Carbon-Heavy Entities Should Be Scared of Both, NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 8, 
2009), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/global-warming-litigation-and-ghost-mrs-palsgraf-
why-carbon-heavy-entities-should-be-scared- (“Any private entity with significant greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions could be identified in the next climate change lawsuit.”). Media coverage 
has also predicted sweeping impacts. See, e.g., Richard Ingham, Billions of Dollars at Stake in 
4
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attention in legal scholarship and media coverage, but we believed there 
had to be more to climate change litigation than that. 
Indeed, what animated this project was our intuition that how the 
courts approach the broad array of types of climate change litigation 
might hold important insights, not only for how climate change policy is 
likely to evolve, and for who is likely to shape it, but more generally for 
the role of the courts in public policy governance. What is largely 
missing from the scholarly assessment are the dozens upon dozens of 
cases of climate change litigation matters which may seem mundane 
when taken individually, but which can inform scholarly evaluation 
when considered cumulatively. The scholarship has equally failed to 
identify and broadly assess what has not been the subject of climate 
change litigation. Without a complete picture of what has and has not 
been within the sweep of climate change litigation, it is difficult to offer 
a robust evaluation of the past, present, and future of climate change 
jurisprudence. This Article is the first to fill those gaps comprehensively 
for assessing the state of play of climate change in the courts.5 
In order to attempt this broader description and evaluation of the 
role of the courts in climate change litigation, we designed a 
comprehensive empirical study to provide a knowledge base that was 
not available from existing legal scholarship and commentary. Our 
study collected pleadings and decisions from all active and resolved 
climate change litigation matters6 and coded each file for a wide variety 
of attributes. Having elsewhere provided a brief initial description of the 
data based on the status of 139 cases filed through 2009,7 we have 
refined and updated the study through 2010 to cover 201 discrete 
litigation matters and now turn in this Article to a much deeper 
                                                                                                                     
Climate Litigation—Law’s Latest Frontier, VANCOUVER SUN, Jan. 24, 2011, at B3 (“[C]limate-
change litigation is fast emerging as a new frontier of law where some believe hundreds of 
billions of dollars are at stake.”); John Schwartz, Courts Emerging as Battlefield for Fights over 
Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, at A1 (reporting that “Swiss Re, an insurance giant, 
compared the[se] suits to those that led dozens of companies in asbestos industries to file for 
bankruptcy, and predicted that ‘climate change-related liability will develop more quickly than 
asbestos-related claims’”); Editorial, The New Climate Litigation, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2009, at 
A16 (“[T]he climate-change lobby is already shifting to Plan B, or is it already Plan D? Meet the 
carbon tort.”). 
 5. For examples of other work providing a broader overview than is typically found in 
legal scholarship, see generally ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32764, CLIMATE 
CHANGE LITIGATION: A SURVEY (2009); JUSTIN R. PIDOT, GLOBAL WARMING IN THE COURTS: AN 
OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LITIGATION AND COMMON LEGAL ISSUES (2006); Alice Kaswan, The 
Domestic Response to Global Climate Change: What Role for Federal, State, and Litigation 
Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39 (2007). 
 6. Our definition of climate change litigation, as well as other study parameters and 
methods, are explained in Section II.A. 
 7. See David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Survey of Climate Change Litigation in 
the United States, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,644, 10,648 (2010). 
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assessment of the climate change litigation experience thus far.8  
We did not enter this project with preconceived notions about what 
we would learn from review of this significant body of case law, but we 
inevitably brought certain assumptions, explicit and implicit, to the 
project. In particular, several empirical and normatively oriented 
questions about the place of courts in climate change policy animated 
our study. At a conceptual level, the imprimatur of the courts confers 
considerable legitimacy on the operation of the administrative state.9 In 
addition, courts have considerable latitude to develop law on their 
own.10 Further, courts sometimes perform a “signaling” function, in 
which they “prod” other government institutions to act.11 But on the 
other hand, overly aggressive judicial review has the potential to 
engender administrative ossification—agency paralysis—among other 
phenomena that many commentators view as counterproductive.12 
There are constraints on unilateral judicial policymaking within our 
tripartite form of government, as well.13 Thus, one of our overarching 
interests was to explore how courts are performing their “legitimating” 
and “signaling” functions, and similarly, how ready they are to proceed 
on their own in this complex policy arena. 
                                                                                                                     
 8. The database and coding method for our study are publicly available at 
http://www.law.fsu.edu/faculty/profiles/markell/litigationdatabase.xlsx and http://www.law. 
fsu.edu/faculty/dmarkell.html. 
 9. See MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW 11 (West 3d ed. 2009); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 
1725, 1810 (1996); Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 438 (2003). 
 10. See, e.g., Int’l Paper v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982) (discussing a court’s equitable jurisdiction when applying a 
statute); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
 11. Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Courts, and the Common 
Law 4 (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 224, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1749398. 
 12. Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1386–87 (1992) (explaining the “ossification” phenomenon in agency 
rulemaking); Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique 
of Judicial Review, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 254 (2009) (asserting that judicial review should not 
be blamed for inappropriate agency inaction and that it is important to look at the context in 
which an agency’s decision to act arises); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing 
the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 
1950–1990, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 1), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1699878 (claiming that their empirical study found that judicial 
oversight, along with White House and Congressional oversight, has “probably not unduly 
harmed rulemaking in the aggregate”). 
 13. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864–66 (1984); 
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 323, 325 (1981) (holding that the 
federal common law was preempted by the Clean Water Act); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 
194 (1978). 
6
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More specifically, we were interested in learning first about the 
following three largely empirical questions: 
1. How much action is there in the court system? Our perception 
that there was far more to climate change litigation than the small 
number of cases discussed in legal scholarship led to this study and its 
central question—whether the legal system is a frequently or rarely used 
tool for addressing climate change-related issues? Our findings indicate 
a rapidly building wave of litigation. 
2. Where is the litigation action hot and where is it cold? Climate 
change is paradigmatically a cross-cutting area involving a host of 
policy arenas and actors. Given this, we wanted to find out where the 
judicial action is—which policy spheres and institutions are receiving 
the litigation spotlight, and which have largely avoided it? As we 
describe, litigation is concentrated in two specific arenas, leaving some 
gaping holes in what could be additional fronts of action. 
3. Who are the players and what is their game? Here we are focused 
on which actors are primarily seeking to use the courts and what they 
are trying to accomplish by doing so. Are plaintiffs trying to get the 
courts to set climate change policy to their benefit? Or are plaintiffs 
seeking to use the courts to leverage the other branches of government 
into action? Or are parties seeking to use the courts to prevent action by 
other branches? Our findings tell an unsurprising story of environmental 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO) frequently suing federal and 
state governments, though litigation by companies and industry NGOs 
is rising fast and intergovernmental litigation was also a significant 
presence. 
Beyond these three empirical aspects, we hoped to learn more about 
what the courts are doing with the claims that have been brought in 
order to advance understanding about a series of important normative 
questions concerning the operation of our regulatory state and the role 
of the courts in it. This series breaks down into four separate but related 
inquiries: 
1. How have courts responded as agencies address (or decline to 
address) climate change through discrete regulatory initiatives and 
adjudicatory decisions? Massachusetts v. EPA was about whether an 
agency must initiate a regulatory response to climate change under its 
statutory mandate. Since then, EPA and other state and local agencies 
have put climate change law on the books in the form of regulations, 
permit issuances and denials, and other discrete decisions.14 Litigation 
over such decisions requires courts to weigh a substantive or procedural 
outcome against specific statutory provisions. Have courts tended to 
side with either pro- or anti-regulation interests as specific regulations 
                                                                                                                     
 14. See supra note 3 and infra Subsection I.C.1. 
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and adjudicatory decisions wind their way through the administrative 
state, and if so, why? Our study suggests a mixed bag with no clear 
favored position in most contexts. 
2. To what extent have courts crafted a distinct climate change 
jurisprudence? Courts can direct agencies to carry out statutory 
mandates and review agency decisions without establishing new 
jurisprudential ground.15 Because climate change presents so many new 
and different policy challenges, litigants may ask courts to chart policy 
directions and establish new doctrine more overtly, and one might 
expect this activism to be more evident when legislatures and agencies 
are inert. An obvious focus of ours was on the common law nuisance 
cases.16 How receptive would the courts be to nuisance as a medium for 
climate change policy? If plaintiffs found an opening initially (on 
justiciability, for example), how would they fare in establishing 
standing, prevailing on liability, and securing relief? The answer, thus 
far, is that we do not know, as there have been few such cases and none 
has progressed to the merits.17 But we can also ask this question in the 
context of regulatory litigation, where litigants may present courts with 
novel interpretations of statutes and regulation. Have courts resisted 
being pulled into these new jurisprudential waters, or have they 
willingly taken the dive? Our study reveals strong indications of judicial 
restraint in this regard—climate change in the courts has been, in fact, 
business as usual. 
3. To what extent have the courts prompted or forced legislative or 
regulatory attention to climate change policy? The so-called “fire 
alarm” theory and other institutional models explore the roles of 
different institutions in galvanizing the regulatory state to act.18 Our 
                                                                                                                     
 15. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of 
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to 
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1199 (2008). 
 16. See supra note 4. 
 17. Although the Supreme Court recently ruled that federal common law claims are 
preempted by EPA’s emerging regulatory initiatives under the Clean Air Act, the Court declined 
to rule on the preemptive effect on state common law claims. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. 
Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
 18. See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional 
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 739 (2011) (“To the extent constitutional law is supposed 
to help solve the agency problem of representative government by ‘guard[ing] the society 
against the oppression of its rulers,’ courts might play the valuable supplemental role of 
authoritatively identifying and publicizing constitutional violations and thus facilitating 
coordinated retaliation by the public at large. Since the public would benefit from judicial 
monitoring of government officials, it would have an incentive to resist any attempt by self-
serving officials to interfere with the Court or undermine its authority. This ‘fire alarm’ account 
of the judiciary’s role in protecting popular sovereignty against untrustworthy government 
agents resonates with modern empirical evidence that the Court’s decisions are no less—and 
possibly more—consistent with public opinion than are those of the political branches.”) 
8
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question here involved the extent to which the courts are serving this 
role—to what extent does the climate change litigation experience 
reveal a strategy by parties, and possibly courts, to nudge or push 
legislatures and agencies into making decisions? We anticipated that a 
likely focus of climate change litigation would be to motivate the other 
branches of government to take action, either on their own initiative or 
because of pressure from business and environmental interest groups 
that would prefer regulatory action to judicial. One seminal case in the 
climate change litigation arena, Massachusetts v. EPA, fits this 
description,19 but is this effect a more widespread phenomenon of 
climate change litigation? Our study shows that plaintiffs often mount 
this style of litigation, but that success rates are low. 
4. What has been the overall impact of climate change litigation on 
the institutional structures of the administrative state? Perhaps the most 
abstract question, or set of questions, involved our conception of the 
regulatory state as comprised of many pieces and actors. We hoped that 
our data might provide insights that would help to unpack this messy 
system of actors and institutions. One of the roles of the courts is to test 
the strength or cohesiveness of the state, in terms of how well the pieces 
fit together.20 We considered three features of our system that might be 
particularly susceptible to judicial intervention and direction. First, 
courts are called upon to review the legitimacy of legislative or 
regulatory action based on conformance to constitutional 
requirements.21 It is the job of courts to identify significant gaps 
between legislative or agency action and the Constitution.22 In addition, 
                                                                                                                     
(footnotes omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 288 (James Madison) (E. H. Scott ed., 
1898)) (citing ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, 
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 50–51 (2007); David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and 
Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723, 731, 786 (2009); Barry R. Weingast, The Political 
Foundation of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245 (1997)); see also 
David Markell, The Role of Spotlighting Procedures in Promoting Citizen Participation, 
Transparency, and Accountability, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 425, 430 (2010); Mathew D. 
McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus 
Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984) (noting that a “fire alarm” mechanism 
empowers citizens to monitor government performance). 
 19. See supra note 3. 
 20. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-534T, CLIMATE CHANGE: 
OBSERVATIONS ON FEDERAL EFFORTS TO ADAPT TO A CHANGING CLIMATE 3 (2009) (publishing a 
statement of John Stephenson, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, discussing how 
well the regulatory pieces fit together at various levels of government), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09534t.pdf. 
 21. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (reviewing an EPA 
regulation under the Delegation Doctrine). 
 22. Courts sometimes invoke the canon that courts should avoid constitutional questions 
when possible in performing this responsibility. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001); Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the 
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courts are frequently asked to adjudicate the legitimacy of agency action 
based on conformance to legislative direction.23 Again, if courts find 
such gaps and find that they are unreasonable, it is up to the courts to 
require the agency to reconsider its approach.24 Third, at least in the 
world of environmental law, many of the major federal laws have 
embraced a “cooperative federalism” structure in which EPA and the 
states share authority, so long as the states are interested in doing so and 
(in EPA’s judgment) have the requisite will, resources, and 
authorities.25 Ultimately, the courts may become involved if this 
relationship somehow becomes frayed.26 These appeared to be three 
major possible fissures in administrative governance that might have 
special salience in the climate change arena; hence, we sought to 
explore the extent to which the case law tests these fissures and how 
these challenges have come out. Our assessment is that climate change 
litigation thus far has not presented exceptional results in any of these 
respects.27 
To be sure, these are not all the questions that could be asked about 
climate change litigation, nor do we purport to have complete answers 
even to this subset. We hope that our list will be useful in at least three 
ways: 1) it will facilitate discovery of any underlying assumptions we 
may have brought to the design of our survey and our analysis of survey 
results; 2) it will provide context about the survey data and thereby 
facilitate review of the data and our description and analysis of the 
results; and 3) it will stimulate future use and expansion of our data set 
by motivating readers to identify and pursue additional questions for 
which the survey data and methodology may help to yield answers, or at 
least some insights on which we have not focused in this Article. 
                                                                                                                     
Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 66 (2008). 
 23. Courts exercise different levels of review, depending on the type and character of 
agency action they are reviewing. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 
(2001); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 24. Courts sometimes use canons that legitimize seeming gaps or fissures of this sort. 
JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 85–101 (2010); 
George F. Allen & Marlo Lewis, Finding the Proper Forum for Regulation of U.S. Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions: The Legal and Economic Implications of Massachusetts v. EPA, 44 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 919, 931 (2010) (discussing EPA’s attempt to invoke the doctrine of absurd results to 
justify the Tailoring Rule). 
 25. See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the 
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1565 (2007); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative 
Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1107–08 (2009); David L. Markell, 
The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a “Reinvented” State/Federal Relationship: The 
Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 32 (2000). 
 26. See, e.g., Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 897 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 27. Signs of possible regulatory state dysfunction may manifest themselves in other 
respects, as well, such as the failure to take action. See, e.g., Ewing & Kysar, supra note 11, 
at 3. 
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To open the dialogue on these empirical and normative inquiries, 
Part I of this Article outlines the scope of climate change litigation. We 
explain what qualifies as climate change litigation in our study and our 
methodology for identifying and coding case attributes, including our 
typology of the claims that have been or likely will be made as climate 
change moves relentlessly forward. Part I closes with a description of 
representative cases comprising the two dominant forms climate change 
litigation has taken thus far in terms of number of cases (rather than 
number of headlines): litigation over whether government agencies 
must impose tougher restrictions on GHG emission sources in rules and 
permits, and litigation over whether government approval of new GHG 
emission sources has adequately followed environmental impact 
assessment procedures.  
Part II then presents and assesses the major findings from our 
empirical study about the state of climate change jurisprudence. The 
vast majority of the climate change cases to date involve courts 
applying conventional rules of statutory construction to determine the 
extent to which agencies must consider climate change in 
decisionmaking under existing substantive and procedural laws. Most of 
the cases have been filed by environmental groups seeking judicial 
interpretations that would require an agency to regulate industry or 
impose liability more stringently to limit GHG emissions or respond to 
the effects of climate change. We call these the “pro” regulation cases. 
While they dominate the landscape, they are by no means always 
successful, and they are increasingly being challenged by the “anti” 
cases, in which industry and other interests use litigation in an effort to 
suppress climate change as a factor in regulation and liability 
decisionmaking. Therefore, the climate change litigation experience, for 
the most part, has been a story of courts deciding whether and how 
administrative agencies must take climate change into account in 
decisionmaking under existing statutes. As most of the statutes involved 
have been on the books for decades and have a substantial preexisting 
jurisprudence, little room is available for the courts to depart from 
precedent to forge new law for climate change in this litigation context, 
even if they were so inclined. The result has been that much litigation 
has led to little more than incremental development of law through the 
courts. 
Part III takes what has been learned from the discussion in Parts I 
and II to circle back to the empirical and normative questions outlined 
above. The empirical story reveals a universe of litigation that is far 
more diverse, complex, and robust than has been outlined in previous 
legal scholarship, but that is also somewhat muddled in many respects. 
We outline the few strong themes that can be extracted and then move 
to our normative questions. There, the story becomes clearer, as it is 
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evident at all levels of inquiry that courts have generally resisted 
litigants’ attempts to make courts a locus of direct policymaking. 
Nevertheless, the imprint of the courts on climate policy is substantial, 
as courts have engaged and decided many important questions. Some 
decisions have opened doors to policymaking by other institutions, and 
others have slammed them shut. Courts may not have established 
climate change policy directly, but they have influenced its content and 
institutional contours dramatically, even as climate change remains in 
its infancy. We suggest paths of research to gain a better understanding 
of this impact. 
Part IV of this Article stretches a bit from the confines of our 
empirical study and findings to speculate about the future of climate 
change litigation. Our study identified trends in climate change 
litigation that seem poised for rapid acceleration, as well as gaps in the 
scope of litigation that will likely be filled in the not too distant future. 
We also expose gaps in legal scholarship on climate change litigation 
and opportunities for opening up new paths of research.  
I.  THE SCOPE OF CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 
A.  Defining, Identifying, and Coding Climate Change Litigation 
The threshold step for our study was to define what qualifies as 
climate change litigation. A broad view might include any litigation 
motivated by a concern about climate change or climate change policy. 
That could mean stopping a coal-fired power plant because of its 
anticipated GHG emissions or blocking state regulation of emission 
sources because of its economic impacts. We concluded, however, that 
such a definition is too broad of a conception for the purposes of an 
empirical legal study. For one thing, it would require that we identify 
motives for litigation, which would, in many cases, require us to make 
uninformed judgments about a litigant’s mental state. Moreover, many 
cases motivated by concern over climate change might not involve 
issues of fact or law that bear directly on relevant questions of climate 
change law and policy. Opposition to a coal-fired power plant, for 
example, might be driven largely by concerns about climate change, but 
the subject matter of the actual litigation claims might not have any 
connection with GHG emissions or climate change impacts. The 
plaintiff’s claim might be that the environmental impact analysis did not 
adequately examine the effects of mercury deposition, or that the permit 
hearing was procedurally defective. Such a case, to the extent that it 
might succeed in preventing the facility from being constructed and 
operating, might be thought of as influencing the law and policy of 
climate change in the broadest sense, but it would not be contributing to 
any discrete body of law bearing a direct connection to climate change 
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issues. 
We decided to define climate change litigation as any piece of 
federal, state, tribal, or local administrative or judicial litigation in 
which the party filings or tribunal decisions directly and expressly raise 
an issue of fact or law regarding the substance or policy of climate 
change causes and impacts. So, in the power plant example, if the claim 
were that the environmental impact assessment failed to take into 
account the effects of GHG emissions, or that the permit hearing was 
defective because the tribunal refused to allow evidence of GHG 
emissions, that would qualify the case as climate change litigation.28 
We recognize that this approach has some limiting effects on the 
pool of cases included in the study. For example, without reading every 
docket entry in a piece of litigation, we cannot be sure that the mention 
of climate change issues of fact or law did not occur at some point in a 
case. Given time and resource constraints, we focused on reviewing 
complaints where we could obtain them, and on intermediate and final 
judicial decisions, to detect whether our criteria were met. Also, in some 
instances, particularly cases in which power plants were opposed, we 
suspected that climate change concerns were indeed a motivating factor 
behind the litigation, but excluded the case from our study because the 
filings failed to meet our criteria. Lastly, we did not include any matter 
that had not actually been filed as active administrative or judicial 
litigation in a tribunal, thus excluding non-adjudicatory events, such as 
the filing of a petition for rulemaking, or pre-litigation events, such as 
issuance of a notice of intent to file suit. 
Having developed our general criteria for climate change litigation, 
the next step was to identify qualifying cases. As an initial source of 
candidate cases, we benefited greatly from a climate change litigation 
inventory system that Professor Michael Gerrard and environmental law 
attorney Cullen Howe have developed and kept updated on a dedicated 
Web site maintained by the law firm of Arnold & Porter.29 We reviewed 
all of the materials Gerrard and Howe identified for each case and also 
attempted to obtain the current status of each matter identified in their 
inventory through traditional legal search engines, Web browser 
searches, and reasonably available additional methods such as 
                                                                                                                     
 28. Our approach is consistent with the criteria Meltz used in his 2009 survey of climate 
change litigation. See MELTZ, supra note 5, at 2 & n.4. 
 29. See Michael B. Gerrard & J. Cullen Howe, Climate Change Litigation in the U.S., 
CLIMATE CASE CHART, http://www.climatecasechart.com (last updated Sept. 7, 2011). Other 
useful litigation tracking sites are found at Howry Law Firm, Climate Change Litigation, 
GLOBAL CLIMATE LAW BLOG, http://www.globalclimatelaw.com/articles/climate-change-
litigation (last visited Nov. 16, 2011), and Warming Law: Changing the Climate in the Courts, 
CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER, http://theusconstitution.org/blog.warming (last visited Nov. 
16, 2011). 
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consulting online dockets or contacting court clerks. Moreover, 
independent of the Gerrard and Howe inventory, we searched for 
climate change litigation cases through standard legal research methods 
and updated any qualifying cases identified. We cut off our search and 
update efforts on December 31, 2010, at which point, after selecting the 
cases that met our criteria and accounting for consolidated litigation,30 
we had identified 201 discrete climate change litigation matters in 
various stages of progress or finality.31 
Building on and expanding Gerrard and Howe’s litigation inventory 
organization system, we developed a coding system in order to help us 
gain a better understanding of important features of the identified 
climate change cases. We sought information in ten broad categories: 
1) the type of plaintiff, 2) the type of defendant, 3) the type of tribunal, 
4) the year of filing and of most recent tribunal action, 5) the type of 
claim being brought, 6) the general objective of the litigation, 7) the 
statutes and other legal sources supporting the claims, 8) the 
jurisdictional mechanism the plaintiffs used to bring the action, 9) the 
status and outcome of the case, and 10) the contribution any tribunal 
decision made to developments in the law. We developed finer 
categorizations for many of these top-level attributes, such as which 
common law or constitutional doctrines plaintiffs relied on for their 
claims, the grounds for dismissal of a case, the type of relief awarded, 
and so on. 
As we reviewed the cases, it became clear that we would need to 
make some judgment calls in coding. One of the dilemmas in empirical 
                                                                                                                     
 30. We counted consolidated cases as one discrete litigation matter if all the plaintiffs in 
the consolidated suits sought the same relief on the same grounds, or as two discrete matters if 
various suits sought opposing grounds for relief. For example, if all suits in a consolidated 
action sought to invalidate an agency rule promulgation on the ground that it was too restrictive 
of greenhouse gas emissions, we counted that as one matter; however, if some of the suits in the 
consolidated action sought to invalidate an agency rule promulgation on the ground that it did 
not go far enough in restricting emissions, we counted them as a separate matter. This approach 
avoided overcounting litigation matters that had been consolidated but allowed us to more 
accurately capture the thrust of the litigation and outcomes.  
 31. This number is lower than the number of cases on the Gerrard and Howe inventory. 
See Gerrard & Howe, supra note 29. Some of the cases in their inventory, such as many 
challenges to coal-fired power plants, did not meet our criteria for climate change litigation 
because the matters involved no issue related to greenhouse gas emissions or climate change 
impacts. Also, their inventory includes petitions for rulemakings and other pre-litigation actions. 
Our study also adjusted for consolidated suits, as explained supra in note 30. Assessments based 
on the Gerrard and Howe inventory thus report a higher number of climate change litigation 
matters and a different overall profile of climate change litigation. See, e.g., Mark Fulton et al., 
Growth of U.S. Climate Change Litigation: Trends & Consequences 6 (Nov. 3, 2010), 
http://www.dbcca.com/dbcca/EN/_media/US_CC_Litigation.pdf (reporting 340 litigation 
matters including multiple suits that have been consolidated, suits involving no climate change 
claims under our criteria, and petitions for rulemakings). 
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work is striking the right balance between detail and aggregation. Some 
cases presented attributes that did not obviously and neatly fit into one 
of our coding categories or which arguably fit into more than one. In 
some such instances, we developed a new category; whereas in others, 
we fit the case into the closest existing category. Several of these 
judgment calls were more problematic to resolve. First, in some 
instances, evaluating the threshold question of whether a matter truly 
qualified as climate change litigation was not straightforward. 
Generally, we tried to be as inclusive as possible within the scope of our 
criteria.32 Next, in terms of coding the case outcome, we decided to 
focus only on the climate change portion of a case in situations 
involving multiple claims. For example, we coded a case as a win for 
the defendant if the plaintiff lost on the climate change ground, even if 
the plaintiff prevailed on a different count in the complaint and 
ultimately succeeded in, say, having a power plant permit revoked. Our 
rationale was that it is more important for our purposes to assess the 
outcome of the climate change law component of the case than to focus 
on the holistic litigation outcome. This approach was especially relevant 
to claims involving numerous alleged defects in an environmental 
impact assessment required for an agency action, where plaintiffs 
sometimes lost on the claim that GHG emissions were not adequately 
considered, but prevailed on some other claim that another impact, such 
as habitat loss, had not been properly assessed. Our study, therefore, is 
narrowly focused on the climate change component of each litigation 
matter. Finally, if all of the relevant claims in a case were advanced to 
the next level of review and resolved before the cutoff date—for 
example, a trial court opinion was reversed on appeal—we coded the 
case outcome based on the higher level tribunal’s decision. If, however, 
the matter was pending on appeal at the time of the cutoff date, we 
coded for the lower level tribunal’s decision and noted that the case was 
                                                                                                                     
 32. For example, the majority of the cases we excluded involved challenges to new power 
plants that were based on prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) or other Clean Air Act 
(CAA) claims and involved solely pollutants other than greenhouse gases. See infra 
Subsection II.C.1 (explaining the CAA PSD program cases). We readily acknowledge that the 
plaintiffs in such cases may have been motivated, at least in part, by a desire to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. Because at the time of the study cutoff date, EPA had not subjected 
any greenhouse gas to regulation for purposes of the PSD or other CAA programs involved in 
these cases (the various regulations did not take effect until January 2011), and because the 
claims in the excluded cases involved other pollutants, we excluded the cases as not meeting our 
criteria. See Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered 
by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004, 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 51, 70, 71) (explaining the timing of greenhouse gas emission 
regulation and why it would not commence until January 2011). On the other hand, if the 
plaintiff raised any claim involving carbon dioxide or other GHG emissions, notwithstanding 
they were not subject to regulation at the time, we included the matter in our study.  
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on appeal as of the cutoff date. 
B.  Typology of Climate Change Litigation Claims 
To help add details to our general definition of climate change 
litigation matters, we also conducted pre-survey literature reviews and 
brainstorming sessions to develop a typology of different claims that 
might be expected to arise in the climate change litigation world. The 
typology includes claims that are actively being litigated in numerous 
cases, such as claims that a species should be listed under the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) because of threats stemming from 
climate change, as well as claims that we thought were unlikely to have 
yet been the subject of litigation but which could arise as climate 
change litigation matures, such as claims that a property owner failed to 
take adequate adaptation measures to respond to sea-level rise.  
We organized the typology first around several broad categories of 
claims and then identified the nature and thrust of the plaintiffs’ claims 
in each category. This approach proved robust, accounting for all but a 
few of the cases we ultimately deemed to qualify as climate change 
litigation. Table I includes a summary of the typology categories the 
cases fall into and the claim types within each category that we 
identified in this study. Table I also includes the number of cases and 
the percentage of the total number of cases identified in each claim type. 
Table I: Summary of Case Numbers by Category and Claim Type 
Category Claim Type Cases # (%) 
Substantive 
Mitigation 
Regulation and 
Enforcement 
 
1. Substantive law claim to prevent or limit a 
legislative or agency decision to carry out, 
fund, or authorize a direct or indirect 
emissions source
28  
(14%) 
2. Substantive law claim challenging a 
legislative or agency decision to reject or 
place limits on proposals to carry out, fund, 
or authorize a direct or indirect emissions 
source 
4  
(2%) 
3. Substantive law claim to require a 
legislature or agency to promulgate a statute, 
rule, or policy establishing new or more 
stringent limits on emissions 
22 
(11%) 
4. Substantive law claim challenging 
legislative or agency promulgation of statute, 
rule, or policy establishing new or more 
stringent limits on emissions  
29 
(14.5%) 
5. Government enforcement claim against 0 
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direct or indirect emissions source alleging 
violation of regulatory or permit limits 
6. Citizen enforcement claim against direct or 
indirect emissions source alleging violation of
regulatory or permit limits
1 
(0.5%) 
Substantive 
Adaptation 
Regulation and 
Enforcement 
 
7. Substantive law claim to require legislative 
or agency action on statute, rule, policy, or 
permit to require new or more extensive 
climate change adaptation actions
0 
8. Substantive law claim to prevent 
legislative or agency action on statute, rule, 
policy, or permit that proposes to require new 
or more extensive climate change adaptation 
actions 
0 
9. Government enforcement claim against 
public or private entity alleging violation of 
regulatory or permit condition related to 
climate change adaptation
0 
10. Citizen enforcement claim against public 
or private entity alleging violation of 
regulatory or permit condition related to 
climate change adaptation
0 
Procedural 
Monitoring, 
Impact 
Assessment, 
and 
Information 
Reporting 
11. Claim to impose on public or private 
entities a new or more extensive monitoring, 
impact assessment, or information disclosure 
requirement focused on GHG emissions, 
impacts of climate change, or means and 
success of climate change adaptation
86 
(43%) 
12. Claim to prevent imposition on public or 
private entities of a new or more extensive 
monitoring, impact assessment, or 
information disclosure requirement focused 
on GHG emissions, impacts of climate 
change, or means and success of climate 
change adaptation
1 
(0.5%) 
Rights and 
Liabilities 
 
13. Claim to extend scope of human rights, 
property rights, or civil rights to provide 
protection of individual or public against 
effects of or responses to climate change
1 
(0.5%) 
14. Claim to impose statutory, tort, nuisance, 
or other property damage or personal injury 
liability on source of emissions or for 
inadequate climate change mitigation or 
adaptation measures
8 
(4%) 
15. Claim to impose contract, insurance, 
securities, fraud, failure to disclose, or other 
business or economic injury liability on 
3 
(1.5%) 
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source of emissions or for inadequate climate 
change mitigation or adaptation measures 
Identification 
of Climate-
Threatened 
Resources 
16. Claim to force agency to identify species 
or other resource as climate-threatened  
11 
(5.5%) 
17. Claim to prevent or reverse decision by 
agency to identify species or other resource as
climate-threatened 
2 
(1%) 
Other 18. Other—not defined by other categories 5 
(2.5%) 
Total Number of Cases 201 
 
As shown in the case number figures in the third column, some of 
the claim types had no matching cases.33 This is a significant finding in 
that it shows that some forms of likely climate change litigation remain 
latent. For example, no case involved a claim regarding substantive 
climate change adaptation regulation or enforcement (claim types 7 
through 10), whereas 42% of the cases focused on the adequacy or 
legality of substantive mitigation regulation measures in agency permits 
and rules (claim types 1 through 6). The other major category, 
accounting for 43% of the cases, involved claims that the causes or 
effects of climate change had not adequately been incorporated into 
monitoring, impact assessment, or disclosure procedures (claim type 
11). The remaining cases account for only 15% (claim types 12 through 
18) of the total and involve a range of claims including litigation over 
whether a species should be protected under the ESA and tort and 
contract liability litigation. Given the strong predominance of the 
substantive mitigation regulation claims and the monitoring, 
assessment, and disclosure claims, this Section delves into more detail 
about their respective content and litigation experiences. 
Because we depend heavily on the typology categories in our 
assessment of climate change litigation in the courts, some elaboration 
on the category descriptions and divisions is appropriate here. 
1.  Substantive Mitigation Regulation and Enforcement 
As the underlying context of Massachusetts v. EPA suggests, a 
major thrust of climate change litigation will likely fall into the broad 
category of litigation over what is referred to as climate change 
mitigation—the scope, demands, and enforcement of substantive 
                                                                                                                     
 33. Two cases contained claims that fell into two or more different categories. We coded 
them as separate matters for each claim type in order to track the characteristics and outcome of 
each claim. As these were the only such instance, we did not consider this coding method to 
skew the statistical analyses in any meaningful sense. 
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regulation of GHG emission sources.34 This scope of litigation includes, 
for example, a claim to prevent or limit a legislative or agency decision 
to carry out, fund, or authorize a direct or indirect source of GHG 
emissions, such as to stop a state government from building, funding, or 
permitting a coal power plant. It also includes actions to require a 
legislature or agency to promulgate a statute, rule, or policy establishing 
new or more stringent limits on GHG emissions by regulating direct or 
indirect sources, such as to force EPA to regulate GHG emissions or to 
force local government to impose green building requirements. 
Enforcement of emissions limits already in place, whether in permits or 
in regulations, also fits this category. And of course, actions to prevent 
or reverse emissions limits in permits or regulations must also be 
accounted for in this category. Unsurprisingly, many cases in our study 
fell into this set of claims, and because of their volume and variety, we 
provide a more in-depth analysis of their content and outcomes 
following the description of the basic typology. 
2.  Substantive Adaptation Regulation and Enforcement 
Although climate change mitigation had dominated the policy scene 
until recently,35 it is now widely agreed that no plausible mitigation 
policy will prevent climate change from occurring—climate change is 
happening already and more will come for decades as “committed 
warming” is locked in based on past emissions, regardless of mitigation 
policy.36 Hence, climate change adaptation will be necessary,37 making 
                                                                                                                     
 34. See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of 
Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 366 n.1 (2010) (“Climate change mitigation ‘refers to 
options for limiting climate change by, for example, reducing heat-trapping emissions such as 
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and halocarbons, or removing some of the heat-trapping 
gases from the atmosphere.’” (quoting U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 10–11 (Thomas R. Karl et al. eds., 2009), 
available at http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf) 
(citing INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: MITIGATION 
app. II at 716 (Bert Metz et al. eds., 2001), available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg 
3/pdf/app.pdf (defining mitigation as “[a]n anthropogenic intervention to reduce the sources or 
enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases”))). 
 35. See id. at 365–71 (recounting the history of policy attention to mitigation). 
 36. See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the 
Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 76 n.59 (citing Neil 
Adger et al., Summary for Policymakers, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 19 (M.L. Parry et al. eds., 
2007) [hereinafter IPCC, IMPACTS], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf (“Past emissions are estimated to involve some unavoidable 
warming . . . even if atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations remain at 2000 levels.” 
(citation omitted)); V. Ramanathan & Y. Feng, On Avoiding Dangerous Anthropogenic 
Interference with the Climate System: Formidable Challenges Ahead, 105 PROC. OF THE NAT’L 
ACAD. OF SCI. 14,245 (2008) (estimating committed warming of 2.4oC even if greenhouse gas 
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“[m]itigation and adaptation . . . both essential parts of a comprehensive 
climate change response strategy.”38 All recent legal scholarship and 
policy dialogue now recognizes that formulating and implementing 
climate change adaptation strategies must be a significant component of 
our domestic climate change law and policy.39 The federal government 
and a few states have only just begun to formulate adaptation policy,40 
                                                                                                                     
concentrations are held to 2005 levels); Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due 
to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1704 (2009) (estimating a 1000-
year committed warming effect)). 
 37. See Ruhl, supra note 34, at 366 n.2 (“Climate change adaptation ‘refers to changes 
made to better respond to present or future climatic and other environmental conditions, thereby 
reducing harm or taking advantage of opportunity. Effective mitigation measures reduce the 
need for adaptation.’” (quoting U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 34, at 
11) (citing IPCC, IMPACTS, supra note 36, app. I at 869, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ 
assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-app.pdf (defining adaptation as “[a]djustment in natural or 
human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which 
moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities”))). 
 38. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 34, at 11. For summaries of 
the legal and policy issues likely to come with climate change, including reviews and syntheses 
of science and law literature on the topic, see Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to 
Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1 
(2009); Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity Is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five 
Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9 (2010); Holly 
Doremus, Adapting to Climate Change with Law that Bends Without Breaking, 2 SAN DIEGO J. 
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 45 (2010); Robert L. Glicksman, Ecosystem Resilience to Disruptions 
Linked to Global Climate Change: An Adaptive Approach to Federal Land Management, 87  
NEB. L. REV. 833 (2009); Ruhl, supra note 34. 
 39. See, e.g., Katherine M. Baldwin, NEPA and CEQA: Effective Legal Frameworks for 
Compelling Consideration of Adaptation to Climate Change, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 775 (2009) 
(“[A]daptation measures must still be employed to combat the impacts of climate change that 
will inevitably occur, despite the institution of heroic mitigation efforts.”); Camacho, supra note 
38, at 14 (“Unfortunately, legislators and regulators in the United States and elsewhere have 
only begun to consider the role of adaptation in combating climate change.”); Craig, supra note 
38, at 14 (“American environmental law and policy are not keeping up with climate change 
impacts and the need for adaptation.”); Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to Climate Change: Who 
Should Pay, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (2007) (“Adaptation has been a neglected topic 
. . . . In my view, this is a mistake.”); Peter Hayes, Resilience as Emergent Behavior, 15 
HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 175, 175 (2009) (“[T]he main game is now adaptation 
which renders mitigation no less urgent, but shifts the political equation in dramatic ways that 
cannot be ignored any longer.”); Thomas Lovejoy, Mitigation and Adaptation for Ecosystem 
Protection, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,072, 10,073 (2009) (“The adaptation part of the climate 
change agenda is only just beginning to get attention, and needs much more right away.”); 
Ileana M. Porras, The City and International Law: In Pursuit of Sustainable Development, 36 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 537, 593 (2009) (“Most climate change experts and policy-makers 
recognize that adaptation and mitigation are not mutually exclusive strategies but must, on the 
contrary be employed in tandem.”). 
 40. See Ruhl, supra note 34, at 374 n.31. The Government Accountability Office 
concluded a comprehensive review in 2009 of federal adaptation policy with the finding that 
“[w]hile federal agencies are beginning to recognize the need to adapt to climate change, there is 
a general lack of strategic coordination across agencies, and most efforts to adapt to potential 
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but to the extent that adaptation measures begin to be implemented 
through proactive or reactive responses to climate change, it stands to 
reason that the courts will get involved (sooner or later) in sorting out 
the scope and demands of any substantive adaptation regulation 
requirements. 
As with the mitigation regulation claims, one can reasonably foresee 
actions being filed to require legislative or agency action on a statute, 
rule, policy, or permit to require new or more extensive climate change 
adaptation measures, such as to require a coastal development permittee 
to retain wetlands as a buffer against sea-level rise. Actions to enforce 
such requirements, as well as to prevent or reverse their promulgation, 
also fit into this set of claims. As shown in Table I, however, our study 
found no cases fitting this category. We discuss the implications of this 
finding later. 
3.  Procedural Monitoring, Impact Assessment, and Information 
Reporting 
The first two typology categories focus on actions leveraging 
substantive statutory requirements relating to climate change mitigation 
or adaptation, such as facility-siting restrictions and emissions limits. 
One can also envision claims leveraging procedural requirements 
through actions to impose on public or private entities a new or more 
extensive monitoring, impact assessment, or information disclosure 
                                                                                                                     
climate change impacts are preliminary.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-113, 
CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: STRATEGIC FEDERAL PLANNING COULD HELP GOVERNMENT 
OFFICIALS MAKE MORE INFORMED DECISIONS 5 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new. 
items/d10113.pdf. A significant step forward came in President Barack Obama’s October 2009 
Executive Order 13,514, which, among other things, endorsed an interagency Climate Change 
Adaptation Task Force “already engaged in developing the domestic and international 
dimensions of a U.S. strategy for adaptation to climate change.” See Exec. Order No. 13,514, 74 
Fed. Reg. 52,117, 52,124 (Oct. 8, 2009). A November 2010 survey of federal agency actions 
concluded that federal agencies have since then begun to develop more coherent adaptation 
policies. See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: WHAT 
FEDERAL AGENCIES ARE DOING 1 (2010), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/doc 
Uploads/FederalGovernmentLeadershiponAdaptation_Nov2010.pdf. To follow the work of the 
Task Force, see Council on Envtl. Quality, Climate Change Adaptation Task Force, WHITE 
HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse. gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/adaptation (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2011). Up-to-date information about state mitigation and adaptation strategies can be 
found through an interactive map tool maintained by the Center for Climate Strategies. CTR. FOR 
CLIMATE STRATEGIES, http://www.climatestrategies.us (last visited Nov. 10, 2011). California 
has established the most detailed state adaptation strategy. See CAL. NAT. RES. AGENCY, 2009 
CALIFORNIA CLIMATE ADAPTATION STRATEGY (2009), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/ 
2009publications/CNRA-1000-2009-027/CNRA-1000-2009-027-F.PDF. At the local level, New 
York City offers an example of a local jurisdiction taking proactive steps toward developing a 
climate change adaptation policy. See Edna Sussman et al., Climate Change Adaptation: 
Fostering Progress Through Law and Regulation, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 55 (2010). 
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requirement focused on emissions, impacts of climate change, or means 
and success of climate change adaptation (such as a demand that 
publicly traded companies disclose their GHG emissions). Indeed, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission issued guidance in 2010 covering 
disclosures related to climate change,41 and Congress recently required 
EPA to promulgate a rule “to require mandatory reporting of 
greenhouse gas emissions above appropriate thresholds in all sectors of 
the economy of the United States,”42 which EPA did in 2009.43 Most of 
the cases falling in this category, however, arise under impact 
assessment statutes that are more general in scope and do not explicitly 
mention GHG emissions or climate change, the issue being whether 
these general requirements should integrate GHG emissions and climate 
change impacts within their scope. While the plaintiffs’ objectives in 
using such procedural requirements may be to prevent approval of a 
facility, the underlying legal context is sufficiently distinct from the 
substantive mitigation category as to warrant separate treatment. Indeed, 
we identified many cases fitting into this category—it is the largest 
single category of cases—and because of their volume and variety, we 
provide a more in-depth analysis of their content and outcomes below 
after describing the basic typology. 
4.  Rights and Liabilities 
We designed the first three claim types outlined above to capture 
litigation focused directly on GHG emission sources and climate change 
adaptation measures. These are, for the most part, fueled by existing or 
new statutory programs. Climate change, however, is also likely to 
unsettle human relations governed by broader constitutional, statutory, 
and common law rights and liabilities. We envisioned three types of 
claims that could fall into this broad “rights and liabilities” category. 
The first includes actions to extend the scope of human rights, property 
rights, or civil rights to provide protection to individuals or the public 
against the effects of or responses to climate change, such as a claim 
that an emissions source violates civil rights or that immigration policy 
for climate refugees violates human rights. Another type includes 
actions to impose statutory, tort, nuisance, or other property damage or 
personal injury liability on emissions sources or for inadequate climate 
change mitigation or adaptation measures, such as a public nuisance 
                                                                                                                     
 41. See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 241). See generally Scott D. 
Deatherage, The SEC Enters the Fray on Climate Risk Disclosure, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 
35, 35 (2011) (discussing SEC regulations and guidance governing climate risk disclosure). 
 42. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 2128 (2008). 
 43. See Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, 56,264 (Oct. 30, 
2009) (to be codified at scattered sections of 40 C.F.R.). 
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action against emission sources or a private nuisance claim for 
destruction of coastal dunes. The third type of action involves claims to 
impose contract, insurance, securities, fraud, failure to disclose, or other 
business or economic injury liability on an emissions source or for 
inadequate climate change mitigation or adaptation measures, such as 
an insurance recovery claim for effects of sea-level rise or a contract 
dispute over a carbon credit market transaction. Like the adaptation 
category of cases, however, the rights and liabilities category of claims 
focuses on litigation over the effects of climate change, rather than ways 
to prevent those effects, and thus is unlikely to be an active field of 
litigation at this time.44 Indeed, Table I shows that very few cases fall in 
this category, the implications of which we discuss later. 
5.  Identification of Climate-Threatened Resources 
A somewhat specialized field of climate change litigation that was 
well underway when we conducted our study involves claims that 
agencies responsible for implementing the ESA should or should not 
use the species “listing” procedures of the statute to identify species 
threatened by the effects of climate change.45 Other existing or new 
                                                                                                                     
 44. For example, one insurance industry observer noted that “[i]t is somewhat surprising 
that there are not more lawsuits which can be found where the existence of insurance coverage 
for global warming claims is at issue. This is likely due to the fact that global warming litigation 
is in its infancy.” Robert Redfearn, Jr., Global Warming Litigation Just Getting Started; Costs 
Will Be Significant, INS. J. (Mar. 4, 2010), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/ 
2010/03/04/107854.htm. 
 45. Section 4(a)(1) of the ESA requires the agencies to: 
determine whether any species is an endangered species or a threatened species 
because of any of the following factors: 
(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its 
habitat or range; 
(B) overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational 
purposes; 
(C) disease or predation; 
(D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or 
(E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued existence. 
23
Markell and Ruhl: An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change In The Courts: A New Ju
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
38 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
conservation statutes conceivably could impose similar duties on 
agencies to identify “climate-threatened” resources such as habitat, 
water sources, wetlands, and so on. We concluded such claims are 
sufficiently distinct from the other categories, and sufficiently 
important, to warrant a separate category. These threatened resource 
identification programs are neither directly regulatory or particularly 
oriented toward mitigation or adaptation, nor are they merely 
monitoring or reporting programs. They also differ from impact 
evaluation programs in that there is no particular proposed action being 
assessed; rather, the agency assesses the condition of a species or other 
resource based on a wide variety of threats, including climate change, 
and designates it for some special status.46 No rights or liabilities are 
imposed directly in connection with the resource identification step, 
though some could follow under the other statutory provisions once the 
resource is identified. At bottom, moreover, we felt that the potential for 
widespread litigation in this category was significant, particularly under 
the ESA, and thus did not want to lose its distinct focus by fitting it into 
another category. 
C.  The Dominant Litigation Prototypes 
As the foregoing shows, the overwhelming majority of climate 
change litigation matters are concentrated in claims involving 
substantive challenges to agency permits and rules and in claims 
challenging agency environmental impact assessments. This regulatory 
context for climate change litigation—what one observer has likened to 
“siege warfare with large armies that battle for decades”47—far 
overwhelms public nuisance and other forms of litigation in terms of 
volume and scope. This Section thus provides a more complete account 
                                                                                                                     
16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2006); see also J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species 
Act: Building Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 32 (2008) (“[Section 
4(a)(1)(E)] could hardly be a more definitive mandate to consider the effects of greenhouse gas 
emissions and climate change on species. Greenhouse gas emissions are unquestionably a 
‘manmade factor,’ and if as abundant evidence suggests they are contributing to climate change, 
they are potentially ‘affecting . . . [the] continued existence’ of climate-threatened species. 
Regardless of their causal agents, atmospheric warming, sea level rise, and other primary 
ecological effects of climate change involve ‘the destruction, modification, or curtailment 
of . . . [species’] habitat or range,’ [and impacts on species and their habitats could exacerbate] 
‘disease or predation.’”). 
 46. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2006) (detailing the factors to be considered when assessing 
whether any species is endangered or threatened). 
 47. Alejandro de los Rios, Public Nuisance Cases ‘Like a Knife Fight in a Dark Alley,’ 
LEGALNEWSLINE.COM (Feb. 14, 2011, 11:21 AM), http://www.legalnewsline.com/news/231095-
public-nuisance-cases-like-a-knife-fight-in-a-dark-alley (“Where environmental law cases 
brought under regulatory actions are like ‘siege warfare with large armies that battle for 
decades,’ public nuisance claims are ‘like a knife fight in a dark alley’ . . . .” (quoting 
environmental attorney John Parker Sweeney)). 
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of the context and experience of these two dominant forms of climate 
litigation. 
1.  Climate Change in Agency Permits and Rules 
One variant of climate change litigation involves substantive 
challenges to legislative action, or to agency rules and permits, which 
are based on the claim that climate change concerns require a different 
response. As Table I reflects, we identified ten possible claim types of 
such substantive challenges in our survey.48 Six involve what we term 
“substantive mitigation regulation,” and the other four involve 
“substantive adaptation regulation.” 
What does the world of climate change substantive litigation look 
like in the context of this typology? Table I shows that virtually all of 
the action to date qualifies as substantive mitigation regulation.  Eighty-
four cases fit into this category, or a total of 42% of the total of 201 
climate change cases in our database. By contrast, zero cases qualify as 
substantive adaptation cases.49  
Of substantive mitigation cases, most of the action to date (more 
than 90%) has been in three claim types: 1) case- or facility-specific 
cases intended to prevent approval for a direct or indirect source of 
GHG emissions, for example, actions to prevent permitting of a coal-
fired power plant (33% of the mitigation cases and 14% of the total 
number of cases); 2) cases to require a legislature or agency to 
promulgate a statute, rule, or policy that establishes more stringent 
GHG emission limits, for example, a petition to force EPA to regulate 
GHG emissions, or a suit to force a local government to impose more 
stringent green building requirements (26% of substantive mitigation 
cases and 11% of the total number of cases); and 3) cases that challenge 
                                                                                                                     
 48. See supra Table I.1. As we noted in Section I.A, defining the concept of climate 
change litigation requires judgment calls. We have probably drawn the concept in narrower 
terms than some other commentators. As one commentator points out, EPA is using various 
“indirect” ways to “reduce the nation’s climate change footprint” beyond direct carbon 
regulation. Margaret Kriz Hobson, As the Clean Air Act Turns 40, ENVTL. F., Nov.–Dec. 2010, 
at 8. For example, EPA regulations intended to control coal ash, hazardous chemicals, and other 
pollutants are likely to lead utilities to shut down some coal-fired power plants that emit large 
amounts of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. Id. 
 49. We have defined “adaptation” claims for purposes of this article to include only those 
claims that base the theory of liability on the defendant’s climate change adaptation behavior—
for example, a government regulation requiring adaptation measures, or a private actor’s failure 
to adapt according to regulatory or common law standards. As noted, there were no such cases 
filed through 2010. Some claims have been filed seeking money damages to allow the plaintiff 
to adapt to climate change, but the theory of liability has been based on failure of the defendant 
to mitigate GHG emissions. See de los Rios, supra note 47 (discussing public nuisance cases). 
As our typology is based on the alleged basis for liability, we coded these cases as type 14. See 
supra Table I.1. 
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statutes or agency rules establishing more stringent limits on GHG 
emissions, for example, suits that seek to prevent EPA from regulating 
GHG emissions (35% of the mitigation cases and 14% of the total 
number of cases).50 
What should we make of these numbers? The world of regulatory 
development and implementation includes at least three key stages.51  
First, legislation and regulation often set general norms or substantive 
requirements. Further, these general norms are frequently applied 
specifically to particular parties through issuance of permits or licenses.  
Finally, once permits are in place, or are supposed to be in place, the 
regulatory state shifts into compliance evaluation and enforcement, as 
needed. 
Litigation is a mechanism for challenging activity (or inactivity) at 
each of these stages.52 We reviewed the cases to learn whether the 
litigation so far is concentrated in any particular stage and if so, which 
one. Thus, we identified cases focusing on rules that set different types 
of norms or requirements. In a sense, these cases occur on the ex ante 
end of the regulatory continuum, in that their aim is to derail legislative 
and regulatory efforts, either because they are too stringent or not 
stringent enough, or to spur regulatory activity. Second, we identified 
cases at the opposite end of the regulatory spectrum, the ex post end, 
most notably, enforcement cases in which a party that emits GHG 
emissions is pursued for alleged violation of regulatory or permit limits. 
We further divided this set of cases into two categories: government 
enforcement cases and citizen enforcement actions.53 Finally, we 
                                                                                                                     
 50. We did not identify any Type 5 cases—that is, cases involving a government 
enforcement action against a direct or indirect GHG emissions source that alleges violation of 
regulatory or permit limits. We did, however, identify one Type 6 case—that is, a citizen 
enforcement action against a direct or indirect GHG emissions source alleging violation of 
regulatory or permit limits. This case, Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Owens Corning Corp., 434 F. 
Supp. 2d 957 (D. Or. 2006), produced a successful substantive outcome for the plaintiffs 
through settlement. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant was constructing a manufacturing 
facility with the potential to emit more than 250 tons per year of greenhouse gases without a 
required preconstruction permit. Id. at 959. While the defendant denied the allegations, it agreed 
to make contributions totaling $300,000 to various projects, including a new “Solar Classroom 
Project” and a new “High Performance Classroom,” and to reimburse the plaintiffs for $250,000 
for attorney’s fees and costs. See Stipulated Order of Dismissal, Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Owens 
Corning Corp., Civ. No. 04-CV-1727-JE (D. Or. June 8, 2006), available at 
http://www.sierraclub.org/environmentallaw/lawsuits/docs/2006-06-08-cornings-signed-stipulat 
ed-dismiss.pdf. 
 51. As is the case with most typologies, this one oversimplifies, but for our purposes, it 
helps to describe key stages in the regulatory state. 
 52. In some circumstances, judicial review of agency action (or inaction) is unavailable. 
See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985) (holding that the Food and Drug 
Administration’s refusal to initiate enforcement proceedings is not subject to judicial review). 
 53. Congress includes citizen suit provisions in many of the environmental laws, in part 
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identified cases situated at more of a midpoint of the regulatory process, 
most notably, cases involving the application of general norms to 
individual circumstances. Actions challenging the issuance of a permit 
that establishes GHG emission limitations are an example of this type of 
case. 
Applying this typology, a significant majority of the substantive 
mitigation cases fit into the ex ante category—fifty-one cases out of 
eighty-four, or 61%. Of these, there is a rough equivalence between 
cases seeking to overturn regulations because they are too stringent 
(twenty-two thus far) and cases seeking to overturn regulations because 
they are too lax or to prompt new regulation for the same reason 
(twenty-nine to date).54 The best known of the latter genre, of course, is 
Massachusetts v. EPA,55 which we review in some depth later. Only one 
case so far is what we would characterize as an ex post case—that is, a 
case that alleges violations of regulatory or permit conditions. In that 
case, the plaintiff was an NGO which had success on the merits and also 
recovered its attorney’s fees.56 Thirty-two cases (38% of the substantive 
mitigation cases) fit into the middle category. These cases involve the 
application of general norms to individual circumstances. As noted 
above, actions that challenge issuance or denial of a permit fit into this 
category. 
As we will discuss in more detail below, intuitively, at least, it is 
unsurprising that litigation at the beginning of a regulatory regime 
would focus primarily on the legitimacy of the regime itself, rather than 
on its implementation.57 It is reasonable to expect that the caseload 
distribution will change over time, as rules are promulgated, permits are 
issued, and operations subject to those permits begin.  
a.  Permit Challenges 
With this 40,000-foot overview in mind for reviewing the 
substantive mitigation cases, we now turn to a more detailed review of 
our claim type 1 cases—challenges to individual permit decisions, such 
                                                                                                                     
because of the widespread belief that citizen enforcers can help to bolster government 
enforcement capabilities. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 
U.S. 49, 61–62 (1987). 
 54. As we note elsewhere, many more cases that fit into these categories have been filed, 
but we generally treat consolidated cases as a single case. See, e.g., supra note 30. 
 55. See supra note 3. 
 56. Owens Corning, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 960; see also Stipulated Order of Dismissal, Nw. 
Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Owens Corning Corp., Civil No. 04-CV-1727-JE (D. Or. June 8, 2006), 
available at http://www.sierraclub.org/environmentallaw/lawsuits/docs/2006-06-08-cornings-
signed-stipulated-dismiss.pdf. 
 57. In drawing this distinction, we recognize that challenges during implementation (for 
example, permit challenges or challenges in enforcement cases) sometimes focus on the legality 
of the underlying regulatory scheme. 
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as actions to prevent a coal power plant.58 Of the twenty-eight cases 
filed to date, seven (25%) are pending with no significant action. Of 
those challenges that have had significant action of one sort or another, 
the vast majority have been unsuccessful. Thus, the initial regulatory 
decision seems to have stuck in a significant majority of cases.59 
Within this type of claim, there has been a substantial line of cases 
that involved whether proposed new facilities or facilities that 
undertook major modifications are subject to the Clean Air Act’s 
(CAA) Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program and its 
Best Available Control Technology (BACT) requirements.60 The PSD 
program is a preconstruction review and permitting program that applies 
to new major stationary sources and to major modifications at existing 
major stationary sources in order to maintain air quality in regions of 
the country that are in attainment with National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS).61 It does so in part by requiring covered sources to 
apply BACT, in order to limit their emissions.62  Under the CAA’s 
PSD program, only pollutants that are “subject to regulation” under the 
CAA must be controlled by potentially expensive BACT 
requirements.63 
In a series of permit challenges and other proceedings,64 NGOs and 
others claimed that EPA’s imposition of various reporting requirements 
on  GHG emissions was enough to make such emissions “subject to 
                                                                                                                     
 58. We have focused in the summaries below on matters or cases that have received a 
decision. 
 59. Some of these cases are initial agency permit decisions. 
 60. See, e.g., In re Desert Rock Energy Co., PSD Appeal Nos. 08-03 et al., 2009 WL 
3126170, at *2 (EAB Sept. 24, 2009); Louisville Gas & Electric Co., Petition No. IV-2008-3, 
2009 WL 7698409 (EPA Aug. 12, 2009) (rejecting petitioner’s request that EPA object to the 
permit on the basis that the permit fails to include requirements for addressing greenhouse 
gases); Deseret Power Elec. Coop., PSD Appeal No. 07-03, 2008 WL 5572891, at *37 (EAB 
Nov. 13, 2008), available at http://ag.ca.gov/globalwarning/pdf/Desert_decision.pdf (remanding 
the permit to reconsider whether to impose a CO2 BACT limit); Sierra Club v. Air Quality Bd., 
226 P.3d 719, 729–30 (Utah 2009) (upholding as reasonable the administrative board’s 
interpretation that CO2 emissions are not subject to regulation); Appalachian Voices v. State Air 
Pollution Control Bd., 693 S.E.2d 295, 301 (Va. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that no provision of 
the CAA or Virginia law controlled or limited carbon dioxide emissions, therefore, carbon 
dioxide was not a pollutant subject to regulation by the Board); Powder River Basin Res. 
Council v. Wyo. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 226 P.3d 809, 826 (Wyo. 2010) (holding that carbon 
dioxide emissions were not subject to BACT analysis and control). 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (2006); Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V 
Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,520–21 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71) (providing a brief overview of the requirements of the PSD 
program, as well as the Title V program). 
 62. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
75 Fed. Reg. at 31,520.  
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 7475. 
 64. See supra note 61. 
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regulation” and thereby trigger PSD and BACT requirements. 
Regulatory bodies and reviewing courts generally found this argument 
for extending PSD and BACT requirements to GHG emissions 
unpersuasive.65 Instead, the judicial and administrative precedent to date 
has declined to impose BACT emission limits on new sources of GHG 
emissions by defining the concept of “subject to regulation” in 42 
U.S.C. § 7479(3) narrowly, so that regulation does not include 
monitoring and reporting requirements; instead, it covers only 
regulations that impose actual emission limitations.66 
This stream of cases in claim type 1 comprised a relatively 
significant volume of litigation during the time period we studied, but it 
seems to have come to an end for two reasons. First, EPA issued a rule 
in April 2010 in which the Agency concludes that the phrase “subject to 
regulation” includes regulation of only those pollutants for which EPA 
requires “actual control of emissions,” and does not include pollutants 
for which EPA regulations “only require monitoring or reporting.”67 
EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) had identified the value of 
such a nationwide determination in its review of particular permit 
decisions, noting that the issue was one of “national scope.”68 Second, 
EPA has now issued a rule in which it subjects carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions to regulation, notably new motor vehicle standards, as of 
January 2, 2011.69 These regulations trigger the PSD program and 
                                                                                                                     
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. 
 67. Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered 
by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004, 17,004–05 (Apr. 2, 2010) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 51, 70, 71) (quoting Memorandum from Stephen L. Johnson, EPA 
Adm’r, to EPA Reg’l Adm’rs (Dec. 18, 2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/NSR/documents 
/psd_interpretive_memo_12.18.08.pdf) (internal quotation marks omitted). On December 31, 
2008, EPA issued an interpretive memorandum that contained its “definitive interpretation” of 
regulated NSR pollutant to include pollutants that are subject to an EPA regulation that requires 
their actual control, but not pollutants that are only subject to regulations that require monitoring 
or reporting. Clean Air Act Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Construction Permit 
Program; Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered by the Federal PSD 
Permit Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 80,300, 80,301 (Dec. 31, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
52). In a letter to a NGO lawyer in February 2009, the new EPA Administrator agreed to 
reconsider the interpretation of “regulated pollutant” and explained that EPA’s formal 
interpretation “does not bind States issuing permits under their own [SIP]” and that “other PSD 
permitting authorities should not assume that the [interpretation] is the final word on the 
appropriate interpretation of Clean Air Act requirements.” But the Administrator did not stay 
implementation of the interpretation contained in the December 2008 Memorandum. Letter from 
Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Adm’r, to David Bookbinder, Chief Climate Counsel, Sierra Club (Feb. 
17, 2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/NSR/documents/20090217LPJlettertosierraclub.pdf. 
 68. Deseret Power Elec. Coop., PSD Appeal No. 07-03, 2008 WL 5572891, at *7 (EAB 
Nov. 13, 2008).   
 69. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516, 31,522 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 
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BACT requirements for covered sources that emit GHGs.70  
In addition to the “subject to regulation” cases, two other cases 
involving challenges to specific projects based on their contribution of 
GHG emissions are worth mentioning because each offers insights 
concerning judicial willingness to overturn agency permitting decisions 
because of climate change and GHG emissions. Citizens Action 
Coalition v. PSI Energy, Inc.71 involved a challenge by various 
environmental groups to a permit for construction of a new power plant, 
on the ground that the permitting authority, the Indiana Utility 
Regulatory Commission, had failed to adequately consider future 
carbon regulations in approving the construction of the plant. The 
parties had presented extensive evidence to the Commission about 
various issues associated with future carbon regulations (for example, 
the options for future regulation, carbon capture, evidence concerning 
costs associated with compliance with carbon regulations, etc.). The 
NGOs had argued that the “facility should be delayed until future 
carbon regulations are known.”72 The court rejected the challenge and 
approved the permit for the new plant. It “recognized that uncertainties 
exist regarding carbon capture and sequestration and ordered [the 
applicant] to continue its efforts to prepare for a future in which carbon 
is regulated,”73 but declined to substitute its judgment for that of the 
Commission. It concluded that the record showed that the Commission 
had carefully considered the issue, including considering alternative, 
renewable sources of energy, but found that the proposed plant was 
reasonable because of its greater reliability.74 
An even more forceful example of judicial restraint is found in In re 
Otter Tail Power Company.75 NGOs intervened in a permit proceeding 
for a new coal-fired energy conversion facility, asserting that CO2 
emissions would contribute to global warming and opposing the permit 
on that basis. The South Dakota Public Utilities Commission (PUC) 
approved the facility, not only on the ground that CO2 emissions are not 
currently regulated by the United States or South Dakota, but also 
                                                                                                                     
71); Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 
600 and 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536, 537, 538). 
 70. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
75 Fed. Reg. at 31,520, 31,522. This rule has been challenged. See, e.g., Coal. for Responsible 
Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, Nos. 09-1322 et al., 2010 WL 5509187 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 10, 2010) (per 
curiam) (denying and granting various motions in an interim opinion regarding the plaintiffs’ 
petition for review of the rule). 
 71. 894 N.E.2d 1055 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 
 72. Id. at 1066. 
 73. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 74. Id. 
 75. 744 N.W.2d 594, 604 (S.D. 2008). 
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because the CO2 emissions from the proposed plant would not cause 
serious injury to the environment. The PUC found that emissions from 
the proposed facility “would [only] increase U.S. emissions of carbon 
dioxide by approximately .0007 [sic], or seven-hundredths of one 
percent[.]”76 In upholding issuance of the permit, the South Dakota 
Supreme Court characterized its task as deciding the “narrow question 
of whether the PUC’s conclusion that [the plant] will not pose a threat 
of serious injury to the environment was clearly erroneous . . . .”77 In 
upholding the PUC’s decision to grant the permit, the court focused 
extensively on the institutional challenge of climate change litigation for 
the courts: 
While global warming and CO2 emissions are 
considered harmful by the scientific community, what will 
pose a threat of serious injury to the environment under 
[the governing State statute] is a judgment call initially 
vested with the PUC by the Legislature. Nothing in [the 
state statute] so restricts the PUC as to require it to prohibit 
facilities posing any threat of injury to the environment. 
Rather, it is a question of the acceptability of a possible 
threat. Resolving what is acceptable for the people of South 
Dakota is not for this Court. The Legislature and Congress 
must balance the competing interests of economic 
development and protection of our environment. . . . [T]he 
PUC’s decision [that the plant should be approved because 
of a variety of factors, such as reliability concerns, 
availability of alternative sources of power, and the volume 
of emissions from the plant compared to nationwide 
emission levels] was not clearly erroneous.78 
In these decisions, as in many others, the courts acknowledge the 
importance of the climate change issue and the need for attention to it.  
But they have proven reluctant to second-guess agency decisionmakers 
charged in the first instance with deciding the “jurisdictional 
boundaries” question of whether the CAA applies to GHG emissions 
and the question of how the risks that such emissions pose should be 
balanced with other policy concerns if jurisdiction attaches. 
In contrast to Citizen Action Coalition and Otter Tail, in a handful of 
cases, applications for new plants that would emit GHGs have been 
denied because of issues relating to GHG emissions. In these cases, the 
                                                                                                                     
 76. Id. at 602 (noting that the PUC concluded that the plant “will not pose a threat of 
serious injury to the environment or to the social and economic conditions of the inhabitants or 
expected inhabitants in the siting area” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 77. Id. at 603. 
 78. Id. at 604. 
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permitting agency based its denial on factors beyond simply considering 
the risk that GHG emissions pose. For example, the Florida Public 
Service Commission (PSC) has used its broad discretion under the 
governing statute to deny an applicant’s petition for an affirmative 
determination of need for two new proposed pulverized coal generating 
units.79 In that case, the PSC noted that Florida law identifies several 
factors for the PSC to consider in making need determinations and does 
not “assign the weight that [the] Commission is to give each of these 
factors.”80 The factors include cost of electricity, cost-effectiveness of 
the proposed plant compared to other alternatives, conservation 
measures that might mitigate need, and other matters.81 The applicant, 
Florida Power and Light, had acknowledged in its application that 
“various scenarios of future carbon allowance costs” could have a 
significant effect on the cost-effectiveness of the project.82 The PSC 
justified its decision to deny the determination of need generally, based 
on the “uncertainty associated with . . . emerging energy policy 
decisions at the state and federal level,” among a variety of other 
factors.83 It appears that the PSC declined to find that there was a need 
for the plant, despite finding that the plant would bolster fuel diversity, 
at least in part because of the uncertainty associated with “regulatory 
factors” and the cost-effectiveness of the proposed plant in light of this 
uncertainty.84 
                                                                                                                     
 79. In re Petition for Determination of Need for Glades Power Park Units 1 and 2 
Electrical Power Plants, 260 P.U.R. 4th 158, 2007 WL 2032916 (Fla. P.S.C. 2007). 
 80. Id. at 160. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 161. 
 84. Id.; see also In re Application of Wis. Power & Light Co., No. 6680-CE-170, 2008 
WL 5273417, at *1 (Wis. P.S.C. Dec. 12, 2008). The Public Service Commission of Wisconsin 
similarly denied a Wisconsin Power and Light plan to build a new 300-megawatt coal-fired 
facility because of concerns that the plant would be too costly when compared to alternatives, 
noting in its November 11, 2008 press release that “uncertainty over the costs of complying with 
future possible carbon dioxide regulations were all contributing factors to the denial.” Press 
Release, Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wis., PSC Rejects Wisconsin Power and Light’s Proposed Coal 
Power Plant (Nov. 11, 2008), available at http://psc.wi.gov/pdffiles/News%20Releases/2008/11 
%20November/NED%20Decision.pdf. In another case, the Washington Energy Facility Site 
Evaluation Council denied an application to certify a site in Washington state for use as a 
combined cycle gasification facility because the application lacked an adequate carbon 
sequestration plan, despite the applicant’s claims that compliance with the statute would be 
futile because it was impossible at present to develop a plan of the sort the statute contemplated 
due to the “technological and economical infeasibility of geological sequestration.” In re 
Application No. 2006-01, Energy Nw. Pac. Mountain Energy Ctr. Power Project, Adjudicative 
Order No. 2, Council Order No. 833, at 2 (Wash. Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council  
2007), http://www.efsec.wa.gov/FILES/orders/833%20-%20PMEC%20stay%20adjud.pdf. The 
Council indicated that even if the applicant were right about the futility of compliance, the 
Council “[would] not interpret the statute to disregard the plain meaning of the legislature.” Id. 
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The actions to prevent authorization of a particular GHG emitting 
project that have had some resolution generally have not gone well for 
parties seeking to prevent approval because of the GHG emissions.85 
The proceedings based on the claim that monitoring and reporting 
requirements for GHGs subjected GHG emissions to regulation 
foundered at the project-specific and the national levels. While many 
decisionmaking bodies, administrative and judicial, have acknowledged 
the risks associated with GHG emissions, this concern has rarely led to 
rejection of projects. Courts in particular have been reluctant to second-
guess permitting bodies, as those bodies have wrestled with how to 
incorporate GHG emissions and the risks they pose into permitting 
decisionmaking processes. 
The decisions in Indiana and Florida provide an interesting contrast 
on the issue of regulatory uncertainty, with the Indiana Regulatory 
Commission allowing a project to go forward despite future regulatory 
uncertainty (and the reviewing court upholding that judgment), and the 
Florida PSC’s decision that the applicant had failed to establish the need 
for new coal-generating units because of “uncertainty associated 
with . . . emerging energy policy decisions at the state and federal 
level.” In Washington state, a statutory initiative that imposed new 
obligations on applicants, in the form of sequestration efforts, proved 
dispositive in one case in which the state’s decisionmaking council 
declined to be influenced by the applicant’s “[i]mpossibility of 
[c]ompliance” argument and instead applied the statutory language 
according to its terms. In short, during the stage of climate change 
litigation through December 2010 an important lesson seems to be that 
the regulatory requirements pertaining to emission of GHGs (or in many 
cases, the lack thereof) have had a significant effect on the outcome of 
permit proceedings and the reasoning of decisionmakers. 
b.  Rule Challenges 
Claims involving agency rules have also been fertile ground for 
climate change litigation. There have been twenty-two claim type 3 
cases to date, for example, actions to force EPA to regulate GHG 
emissions, to force local governments to impose green building 
requirements, etc. These cases fit into the ex ante category of litigation 
under the framework we describe above. Eight are pending with no 
significant action to date (36% of the claim type 3 cases). The Supreme 
Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,86 involving a challenge 
                                                                                                                     
at 5. 
 85. Aside from the limited number of decisions to date, it is likely that opposition to 
certain projects because of GHG emissions has been successful for different reasons and in 
different ways. Our study is limited to the decisions in our database. 
 86. 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007). 
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to EPA’s 2003 denial of a petition asking EPA to regulate GHG 
emissions under the CAA,87 is undoubtedly the most prominent case of 
this type. 
Before the Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, EPA had 
declined to regulate GHG emissions directly under the CAA.88  EPA 
concluded in part that the CAA does not authorize EPA to issue 
mandatory regulations to address climate change, including regulations 
that cover GHG emissions, because Congress did not intend that carbon 
dioxide be treated as an “air pollutant.”89 The petitioners claimed that 
EPA was obligated to regulate GHG emissions from new motor vehicle 
sources under CAA § 202(a)(1) because: 1) GHG emissions qualify as 
“air pollutants,” and 2) such emissions from new motor vehicles cause 
or contribute to air pollution that endangers public health or welfare.90 
While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit denied the petition 
for review, holding that “the EPA Administrator properly exercised his 
discretion under § 202(a)(1) in denying the petition for rulemaking,”91 
the Supreme Court disagreed. 
The Court framed the issues as “whether EPA has the statutory 
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor 
vehicles; and if so, whether its stated reasons for refusing to do so are 
consistent with the statute.”92 Applying CAA § 202(a)(1), the Court 
                                                                                                                     
 87. See Petition for Rulemaking and Collateral Relief Seeking the Regulation of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New Motor Vehicles Under § 202 of the Clean Air Act (Oct. 
20, 1999), available at http://www.icta.org/doc/ghgpet2.pdf; Control of Emissions from New 
Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,933 (Sept. 8, 2003) (denying the 
petition). 
 88. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 
52,933. 
 89. Id. As has been well-chronicled, EPA’s legal views concerning whether the CAA 
empowered the agency to regulate GHG emissions have evolved over the years. In a 1998 
memo, then General Counsel Jonathan Cannon concluded that EPA possessed such authority, 
while in 2003, the General Counsel at that time, Robert Fabricant, reached the opposite 
conclusion. Memorandum from Jonathan Z. Cannon, EPA Gen. Counsel, to Carol M. Browner, 
EPA Adm’r, EPA’s Authority to Regulate Pollutants Emitted by Electric Power Generation 
Sources (Apr. 10, 1998), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/faculty/bpercival/ 
casebook/documents/epaco2memo1.pdf; Memorandum form Robert E. Fabricant, EPA Gen. 
Counsel, to Marianne L. Horinko, EPA Acting Adm’r, EPA’s Authority to Impose Mandatory 
Controls to Address Global Climate Change Under the Clean Air Act (Aug. 28, 2003), available 
at http://www.icta.org/doc/FabricantMemoAug282003.pdf. 
 90. Petition for Rulemaking and Collateral Relief Seeking the Regulation of Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions from New Motor Vehicles Under § 202 of the Clean Air Act 9 (Oct. 20, 1999), 
available at http://www.icta.org/doc/ghgpet2.pdf. 
 91. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The appellate panel issued 
three separate opinions. Judge Randolph authored the language quoted in the text. Judge 
Sentelle concurred in this reasoning, although he also dissented in the case on the ground that 
the petitioners lacked standing. Judge Tatel dissented. 
 92. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007). Before reaching the merits, the 
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held that carbon dioxide and other GHGs easily fit “well within the 
Clean Air Act’s capacious definition of ‘air pollutant.’”93 Further, the 
Court held that GHG emissions are a form of “air pollution which may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”94 The 
Court concluded that EPA “can avoid taking further action [that is, the 
agency can decline to regulate GHG emissions under § 202(a)(1)] only 
if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate 
change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot 
or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do.”95 
Since the Court’s opinion, EPA has initiated and completed several 
rulemakings. Directly responding to the Court, EPA issued its 
Endangerment Finding with respect to emissions of GHG air pollutants 
from new motor vehicles in December 2009.96 The Agency observed 
that CAA § 202(a) establishes a two-part test for making such a finding: 
first, that an air pollutant must endanger public welfare; and second, that 
emissions of such pollutants from particular sources cause or contribute 
to this endangerment.97 In its rule, EPA referred to this second finding 
as the “cause or contribute” finding.98 EPA determined that emissions of 
GHGs provide the basis for a finding of endangerment to public welfare 
for a variety of reasons, including “risks to food production and 
agriculture, forestry, water resources, sea level rise and coastal areas, 
                                                                                                                     
Court held that at least the State of Massachusetts had standing to challenge EPA’s petition 
denial. Id. While the Court’s standing analysis obviously has the possibility of influencing 
future litigation, we focus in the text on the Court’s treatment of the merits of the case. For 
reviews of the Court’s treatment of standing, see, e.g., Kevin M. Davis, The Road to Clean Air 
Is Paved with Many Obstacles: The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Should Grant a 
Waiver for California to Regulate Automobile Greenhouse Gas Emissions via Assembly Bill 
1493, 19 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 39 (2009); Amy J. Wildermuth, Why State Standing in 
Massachusetts v. EPA Matters, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 273 (2007). 
 93. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532. The Court held that the “sweeping definition” of “air 
pollutant” in the CAA includes greenhouse gas emissions because each of the greenhouse gases 
at issue in the petition is, “without a doubt,” a “physical [and] chemical . . . substance[] or 
matter which [is] emitted into . . . the ambient air.” Id. at 528–29 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The CAA defines “air pollutant” to include “any air pollution agent . . . , including any 
physical, chemical, biological, radioactive . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or 
otherwise enters the ambient air.” 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2006). It defines “welfare” to include 
“effects on . . . weather . . . and climate.” Id. § 7602(h). 
 94. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)). 
 95. Id. at 533. While EPA had provided several reasons for its decision not to regulate 
GHG emissions, the Court found the Agency’s reasoning unpersuasive because in the Court’s 
view, the Agency’s reasoning was not based on the framework in CAA § 202(a)(1). 
 96. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
ch. I). 
 97. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,536. 
 98. Id. 
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energy, infrastructure, and settlements, and ecosystems and wildlife.”99 
Further, EPA found that the emission of GHG air pollutants emitted 
from motor vehicles “cause or contribute to this air pollution.”100 
Seventeen petitioners challenged EPA’s Endangerment Finding in 
the D.C. Circuit, ranging from states, to proponents of small 
government, to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National 
Association of Manufacturers.101 The D.C. Circuit consolidated these 
challenges in February 2010, under the style Coalition for Responsible 
Regulation v. Environmental Protection Agency.102 In addition to the 
seventeen petitions filed in the D.C. Circuit, ten petitions were filed 
with EPA asking the Agency to reconsider its Endangerment Finding.103 
In August 2010, EPA denied these petitions.104 Several parties 
challenged the EPA denial and the D.C. Circuit consolidated these 
challenges with the pending challenges to the Endangerment Finding.105 
While EPA’s Endangerment Finding did not impose requirements 
on GHG emitters, the Finding was a prerequisite for finalizing 
regulations that do impose such requirements. EPA has been extremely 
active in promulgating such regulations. The Agency launched a 
cascade of agency rulemaking initiatives, and it has finalized a series of 
regulations that will limit GHG emissions from a wide variety of mobile 
and stationary sources and impose monitoring and reporting obligations 
on GHG emitters, as well. Some participants in the litigation 
challenging these EPA rules have characterized the rules as posing 
“perhaps the most significant set of administrative law challenges [that 
the D.C. Circuit] has ever confronted.”106 The rules, in the view of one 
                                                                                                                     
 99. Id. at 66,534. 
 100. Id. at 66,536. 
 101. See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, Nos. 09-1322 et al., 2010 WL 
5509187 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 10, 2010) (per curiam) (denying and granting various motions in an 
interim opinion regarding the plaintiffs’ petition for review of the rule). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See, e.g., Petition for Reconsideration of Endangerment and Cause or Contribute 
Finding for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act by Virginia ex rel. 
Cuccinelli, No. EPA-HQ-OAR 2009-0171 (Feb. 16, 2010), available at http://epa.gov/climatech 
ange/endangerment/downloads/Petition_for_Reconsideration_Commonwealth_of_Virginia.pdf; 
see also EPA’s Denial of the Petitions to Reconsider the Endangerment and Cause or Contribute 
Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 49,556, 
49,557 (Aug. 13, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1) (denying the ten petitions). 
 104. EPA’s Denial of the Petitions to Reconsider the Endangerment and Cause or 
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 75 Fed. 
Reg. at 49,556. 
 105. One observer suggests that the Endangerment Finding is “least vulnerable to attack” 
of EPA’s rules concerning GHG emission restrictions and is “swaddled in at least three layers of 
Kevlar-like legal protections.” Daniel A. Farber, Litigating Clean Air Endangerment, ENVTL. F., 
Nov.–Dec. 2010, at 12. 
 106. Motion for Coordination of Related Cases at 1, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc., 
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opponent, “achieve a stark result—the imposition of controls on carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions on the national 
economy.”107 
These rules include EPA’s “tailpipe rule,”108 its “timing” or 
“triggering rule,”109 and its “tailoring rule.”110 This suite of rules is 
currently subject to a broad array of challenges in the D.C. Circuit. As 
one recent article puts it, “[o]ne striking fact about these suits is the pure 
number of claims: over eighty distinct claims” have been filed by thirty-
five different petitioners to four EPA rules (including the challenges to 
EPA’s Endangerment Finding referenced above).111 To many close 
observers, the level of legal activity is not surprising. In addition to the 
stakes involved, some have suggested that efforts to regulate GHG 
emissions from stationary sources, especially under the CAA, have a 
“square peg, round hole” character. Ann Klee, former EPA General 
Counsel, noted during an Environmental Law Institute (ELI) forum that 
“the agency is trying to do everything that it can with a statute that is 
clearly not intended to deal with the very complex world of major 
climate change.”112 
EPA’s May 2010 Tailpipe Rule, which EPA issued jointly with the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),113 follows 
                                                                                                                     
Nos. 09-1322 et al., 2010 WL 5509187, available at http://www.eenews.net/assets/2010/09/13/ 
document_gw_06.pdf. 
 107. Id. The parties cited an Office of Management and Budget memorandum for the 
proposition that “[m]aking the decision to regulate CO2 under the CAA for the first time is 
likely to have serious economic consequences for regulated entities throughout the U.S. 
economy, including small businesses and small communities.” Id. at 3 n.† (citing First (1st) 
Round of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Comments to USEPA on Proposed 
Findings 2 (Apr. 22, 2009),  http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-
2009-0171-0124). 
 108. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 85, 86, 600, and 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536, 537, 538). 
 109. Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered 
by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 40, 51, 70, 71). 
 110. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71). 
 111. Gregory E. Wannier, EPA’s Impending Greenhouse Gas Regulations: Digging 
through the Morass of Litigation (Nov. 23, 2010), https://www.law.columbia.edu/null/download 
?&exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=542157. A Deutsche Bank report indicates that 82 of 
the 108 lawsuits initiated in 2010 fit into this category. Fulton et al., supra note 31, at 6. 
 112. Ann Klee, former EPA Gen. Counsel, 2010 Environmental Law Institute Miriam 
Hamilton Keare Policy Forum: Can You Teach Old Tools New Tricks? Addressing 21st 
Century Problems with 20th Century Law (Oct. 19, 2010) (transcript available at 
www.eenews.net/tv/transcript/1226). 
 113. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 25,324. President Obama announced on May 
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up on EPA’s Endangerment Finding (which found that GHG emissions 
from mobile sources contribute to endangering public health and 
welfare) by establishing GHG emission standards for “light duty 
vehicles” for model years 2012 through 2016.114 EPA finalized GHG 
emissions standards under the CAA, while NHTSA finalized corporate 
average fuel economy (CAFE) standards under the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act.115 Seventeen petitions for review of the Tailpipe Rule 
have been filed with the D.C. Circuit, all of which have been 
consolidated.116 
                                                                                                                     
19, 2009, that EPA and the NHTSA would work together on a rule that would integrate CAFE 
standards (NHTSA’s function) with national GHG standards (EPA’s function). ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, EPA-420-F-09-028, REGULATORY ANNOUNCEMENT: EPA WILL PROPOSE HISTORIC 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS STANDARDS FOR LIGHT-DUTY VEHICLES (2009), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oms/climate/regulations/420f09028.pdf. 
 114. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 25,324. According to the agencies, the rules 
“will achieve substantial reductions of GHG emissions . . . from the light-duty vehicle part of 
the transportation sector, based on technology that is already being commercially applied in 
most cases and that can be incorporated at a reasonable cost.” Id. at 25,326. EPA summarizes as 
follows the contribution of the mobile sources targeted in this rule: 
Mobile sources emitted 31 percent of all U.S. GHGs in 2007 (transportation 
sources, which do not include certain off-highway sources, account for 28 
percent) and have been the fastest-growing source of U.S. GHGs since 1990.  
Mobile sources addressed in the recent endangerment and contribution findings 
under CAA section 202(a)—light-duty vehicles, heavy-duty trucks, buses, and 
motorcycles—accounted for 23 percent of all U.S. GHG in 2007. Light-duty 
vehicles . . . are responsible for nearly 60 percent of all mobile source GHGs 
and over 70 percent of Section 202(a) mobile source GHGs. 
Id. at 25,326 (footnotes omitted). 
 115. Id. at 25,324. 
 116. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 10-1092 (D.C. Cir. filed May 7, 
2010). There were several challenges to the Tailpipe Rule. On July 23, 2010, EPA filed a 
motion to consolidate the cases and on August 5, 2010, the court granted the motion to 
consolidate. Motion to Consolidate Cases, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc., No. 10-1092 
(D.C. Cir. July 23, 2010); Order Granting Motion to Consolidate, Coal. for Responsible 
Regulation, Inc., No. 10-1092 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 5, 2010). This is not the only administrative 
action concerning mobile sources that may see a courtroom. EPA and NHTSA are currently 
developing another rule to establish standards for model years 2017 through 2025. 2017–2025 
Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle GHG Emissions and CAFE Standards: Supplemental Notice of 
Intent, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,758 (Aug. 9, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600, and 49 
C.F.R. pts. 531, 533). A May 4, 2010, Congressional Research Service report indicates that EPA 
has received ten petitions asking the Agency to regulate GHG emissions from other mobile 
sources, with all but one focused on mobile sources such as aircraft, ocean-going ships, 
locomotives, nonroad vehicles, and their fuels. JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R40506, CARS, TRUCKS, AND CLIMATE: EPA REGULATIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES FROM 
MOBILE SOURCES 5–6 (2010). EPA’s response to these petitions may well trigger more 
litigation—for example, litigation challenging EPA’s denial of any petitions and litigation 
challenging any rules EPA issues. Thus, the nature of the litigation that is likely to ensue 
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EPA determined in a third rulemaking, known as the “timing rule,” 
the “triggering rule,” or the “reconsideration decision,”117 that on 
January 2, 2011—that is, the first day of the first model year in which 
manufacturers would be required to meet the new motor vehicle 
standards EPA promulgated in May 2010—those mobile source 
emission control standards would trigger PSD controls on GHG 
emissions from stationary sources.118 In this rulemaking, EPA upheld an 
earlier Agency interpretation that the PSD permit requirements apply 
only to pollutants that are subject to actual control of emissions under 
either a statutory or regulatory provision, and do not apply to pollutants 
that are merely subject to monitoring or reporting requirements but not 
to actual controls.119 EPA further determined that the PSD permitting 
requirements “will apply to GHGs upon the date that the anticipated 
tailpipe standards for light-duty vehicles . . . take effect. . . . [T]hose 
standards will take effect when the 2012 model year begins, which is no 
earlier than January 2, 2011.”120 
Eighteen petitioners have sought review of this rule in the D.C. 
Circuit, including a mix of states, nonprofits, and industry groups.121 
The court has consolidated these challenges along with challenges to 
EPA’s Tailoring Rule.122 
On June 3, 2010, EPA issued its Tailoring Rule, which limits GHG 
emissions from stationary sources.123 EPA characterizes the Tailoring 
Rule as a “common sense approach” to regulating GHG emissions from 
stationary sources under the CAA permitting program.124 EPA claims 
                                                                                                                     
depends on the nature and extent of EPA’s regulatory treatment of mobile sources. 
 117. Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered 
by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 50, 51, 70, 71). 
 118. Id. at 17,004, 17,007, 17,019.  
 119. See supra note 68. 
 120. Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered 
by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. at 17,007.  Further, EPA is deferring 
applying the PSD and Title V provisions for sources that are major based only on emissions of 
GHGs until a date that extends beyond January 2, 2011. Id. at 17,004. 
 121. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 10-1073 (D.C. Cir. filed Apr. 2, 
2010); Lawrence Hurley, EPA: Court Consolidates 2 Challenges to Emission Regulations, 
GREENWIRE, Nov. 17, 2010, http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2010/11/17/7.  
 122.  Hurley, supra note 121; Se. Legal Found. v. EPA, No. 10-1131 (D.C. Cir. filed June 
3, 2010). On November 16, 2010, the D.C. Circuit acceded to an EPA request that the Timing 
Rule and Tailoring Rule should be addressed together. Order Granting in Part and Denying in 
Part Motion for Coordination of Related Cases, Se. Legal Found. v. EPA, No. 10-1131 (D.C. 
Cir. Nov. 16, 2010). 
 123. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71). 
 124. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Fact Sheet on the Prevention of Significant Deterioration and 
Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule 1, available at http://www.epa.gov/nsr/documents/2010 
0413fs.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2011). 
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that this tailoring approach is legally supportable based on three legal 
doctrines:  
1) [T]he “absurd results” doctrine, which authorizes 
agencies to apply statutory requirements differently than a 
literal reading would indicate, as necessary to effectuate 
congressional intent and avoid absurd results, 2) the 
“administrative necessity” doctrine, which authorizes 
agencies to apply statutory requirements in a way that 
avoids impossible administrative burdens[,] and 3) the 
“one-step-at-a-time” doctrine, which authorizes agencies to 
implement statutory requirements a step at a time.125 
Not surprisingly, the rule and its underlying tailoring rationales have 
been challenged.126  The litigants are seeking to hoist EPA on the legal 
foundation it has constructed, notably that EPA should be able to 
deviate from the emission level requirements in the CAA under the PSD 
and Title V programs because adherence to those requirements for GHG 
emissions would produce “absurd results.” As of this writing, the 
outcomes of these legal challenges to this suite of four EPA rules 
remain uncertain. Their fate in the courts, and perhaps in Congress as 
well, will have a significant effect on the approaches the country takes 
to address GHG emissions.127 In addition to these relatively broad-scale 
rulemaking initiatives, EPA has engaged in other, more targeted 
rulemaking in order to reduce climate change emissions, and these have 
attracted litigation, as well.128 There has also been a variety of rules-
                                                                                                                     
 125. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516. 
 126. In September 2010, all twenty-six cases were consolidated under Southeastern Legal 
Foundation v. EPA, No. 10-1131 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 3, 2010). 
 127. See, e.g., 21st Century Problems, 20th Century Laws, ENVTL. F., Jan.–Feb. 2011, 42, 
44 (quoting former EPA General Counsel Ann Klee as stating that “[w]hether the Tailoring Rule 
survives or not is critical to the success of the rest of EPA’s regulations. Without the Tailoring 
Rule, the [CAA] simply cannot manage the regulatory burdens that will be imposed if the 
agency uses it to address [GHG] emissions”); Dean Scott, EPA’s Greenhouse Gas, Boiler Rules 
Top Regulatory Complaints in Letters to Issa, DAILY ENVIROWIRE, Feb. 8, 2011, http://events. 
awma.org/pressroom/index.html?id=2216 (Environmental rules governing greenhouse 
gases . . . got top billing by dozens of industry groups asked . . . to provide examples of overly 
burdensome regulations . . . .”); Elana Schor, EPA: House GOP Ponders Blocking Funds for 
Emissions Regs, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Feb. 9, 2011, http://www.eenews.net/EEDaily/print/ 
2011/02/09/3 (noting that there has been discussion in Congress about limiting funding for 
enforcement of EPA’s GHG emission regulations). 
 128. In November 2010, for example, in the new source review context, cement 
manufacturers and environmental groups filed nineteen lawsuits to challenge an EPA rule that 
established new source performance standards (NSPS) and national emissions standards for 
hazardous air pollutants (NESHAPS) for cement kilns. Portland Cement Ass’n v. EPA, No. 10-
1358 (D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 5, 2010). EPA also has recently entered into settlements with NGOs 
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related litigation matters involving state laws and regulations.129 
Federalism issues were often wrapped into the rules challenges 
cases. For example, two Texas v. EPA cases130 involve a Texas 
challenge to an EPA interim rule issued in December 2010, in which the 
Agency partially disapproved Texas’ PSD program on the ground that 
Texas did not address the program’s application to GHG emissions that 
would become subject to the program in early 2011.131 As EPA and 
others grapple with how best to apply the CAA regulatory framework to 
                                                                                                                     
that filed suit to require EPA to set GHG emission standards for the petroleum and electric 
generating unit industries. Proposed Settlement Agreement, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,390, 82,391 (Dec. 
30, 2010). In some cases, this more targeted litigation has yielded commitments by the Agency 
to promulgate emission standards for GHGs by some date certain, though the precise standards 
remain in question. In other cases, EPA or another federal agency has agreed to decide whether 
to issue standards by a date certain.  We view this latter category of cases to be “deadline suits,” 
in that they seek a court order obligating an agency to take action by a date certain based on a 
non-discretionary duty. 
 129. See, e.g., Citizens for Envtl. Inquiry v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, No. 286773, 2010 WL 
446047 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2010) (involving an unsuccessful effort by citizens first to 
persuade the state environmental agency, the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), to 
promulgate a rule regulating CO2 emissions and then to persuade the Michigan courts to require 
DEQ to do so). The court in Citizens held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that they had 
“a clear legal right to the promulgation of specific rules regarding CO2 emissions” because the 
plaintiffs had failed to allege a specific injury that warranted the mandamus relief they were 
seeking. Id. at *1. The court also held that the plaintiffs could not bring a claim alleging that the 
Michigan Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) imposes a legal duty on the DEQ to determine 
the impacts of CO2 emissions on the environment as part of the air permitting process because 
the MEPA authorizes private actions only “against regulated or regulable actors who are 
specifically engaged in ‘wrongful conduct’ that harms the environment,” not against the DEQ 
for its determinations of permit eligibility. Id. at *3; see also New Energy Econ., Inc. v. 
Shoobridge, 243 P.3d 746 (N.M. 2010) (involving an environmental group’s request that the 
New Mexico Board promulgate regulations to control GHG emissions, the Board’s decision to 
conduct a rulemaking proceeding, and a challenge to the Board’s authority to regulate GHG 
emissions until the State first established a NAAQS for GHGs). The court in New Energy 
Economy allowed the Board to continue its administrative process without judicial intervention, 
reasoning that it “should not intervene to halt administrative hearings before rules or regulations 
are adopted.” New Energy Econ., 243 P.3d at 751. The court invoked “prudential 
considerations” in determining that “[j]udicial action that disrupts the administrative process 
before it has run its course intrudes on the power of another branch of government.” Id. at 752; 
see also In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794 (Minn Ct. App. 1998) (upholding 
the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission’s (PUC) implementation of a Minnesota statute, 
which required the PUC to set “environmental cost values” for different methods of electricity 
generation, on the grounds that the PUC had the expertise to determine environmental cost 
values and that its decisions were defensible that CO2 negatively affects the environment and on 
the values it set). 
 130. Texas v. EPA, No. 10-1425 (D.C. Cir. filed Dec. 30, 2010); Texas v. EPA, No. 10-
60961 (5th Cir. filed Dec. 15, 2010). 
 131. Texas, No. 10-60961; Benjamin Thomas, Texas and EPA Battle over Greenhouse Gas 
Regulations, REGBLOG (May 9, 2011), http://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/regblog/2011/05/texas-
and-epa-battle-over-greenhouse-gas-regulations.html. 
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limit GHG emissions from stationary sources, it is likely that there will 
be considerable tension between EPA and the states as they work 
through the sources to be covered, the approaches to be taken, and the 
division of responsibilities for the work that needs to be done.132 
Several rule challenge cases have addressed another issue that arises 
with the federal system’s effort to limit GHG emissions—that of 
preemption. In Ass’n of Taxicab Operators USA v. City of Dallas,133 the 
City of Dallas adopted an ordinance that gave a preference to taxicabs 
that run on compressed natural gas to move to the front of the line in 
taxicab queues at Dallas Love Field Airport. The Taxicab Operators 
Association claimed that the ordinance was preempted by the CAA 
because it established an emissions standard. The court denied the 
request for a preliminary injunction, allowing the ordinance to stand, 
because it was not persuaded that the plaintiffs would prevail on the 
merits.134 
In contrast, Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade v. City of New 
York135 involved a successful preemption claim regarding a local 
ordinance. New York City’s Taxicab & Limousine Commission (TLC) 
had amended its lease rates for taxicabs in order to increase incentives 
for fleet owners to use hybrid-engine and fuel-efficient vehicles. The 
City’s rules increased the “lease caps” for these vehicles and reduced 
the lease caps for non-hybrid, non-clean diesel vehicles.136 The district 
court had granted the taxicab board’s request for a preliminary 
injunction, finding that the new lease caps were sufficiently likely to be 
preempted by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) and the 
CAA. The EPCA preemption clause provides: 
[A] State or a political subdivision of a State may not adopt 
or enforce a law or regulation related to fuel economy 
standards or average fuel economy standards for 
automobiles covered by an average fuel economy standard 
under this chapter.137 
 
                                                                                                                     
 132. Beyond the Texas situation discussed above, EPA has had to issue several “friendly 
FIPS” (federal implementation plans) because some states are not yet prepared to integrate GHG 
emissions controls into their PSD programs. Action to Ensure Authority to Issue Permits Under 
the Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program to Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: 
Federal Implementation Plan, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,246 (Dec. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 52). 
 133. 760 F. Supp. 2d 693 (N.D. Tex. 2010). 
 134. Id. at 694. 
 135. 615 F.3d 152 (2nd Cir. 2010). 
 136. Id. at 155. 
 137. 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2006). 
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding 
that the City’s rules, which were “based expressly on the fuel economy 
of a leased vehicle, plainly fall within the scope of the EPCA 
preemption provision. The plaintiffs, therefore, have demonstrated . . . a 
certainty, of success on the merits.”138 
A challenge to regulatory action that would establish new or more 
stringent limits on GHG emissions was successful in Air Conditioning, 
Heating and Refrigeration Institute v. City of Albuquerque.139 The case 
involved a challenge on federal preemption grounds to an Albuquerque 
City Council Energy Conservation Code provision which regulates the 
“designs and techniques to achieve the effective use of energy.”140 The 
court agreed for some of the challenged provisions of the Code, but not 
all, citing the broad preemption language in the National Appliance 
Energy Conservation Act141 and the legislative history, which noted, 
among other things, that Congress recognized that the Act “preempt[s] 
State law under most circumstances.”142 
2.  Climate Change in Agency Impact Assessments 
Just as litigants have battled over the extent to which climate change 
issues must or must not be integrated into substantive decisionmaking 
under existing environmental laws, so too has the litigation front 
reached environmental law’s extensive array of procedural 
requirements, particularly those requiring assessment of the 
environmental impacts of proposed actions. These climate change 
litigation matters fall into claim types 11 and 12. Most prominently, 
thirty-four cases—one-sixth of all climate change litigation matters—
involved claims brought under the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA), which requires all federal agencies to  
                                                                                                                     
 138. Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade, 615 F.3d at 158. See also Lincoln-Dodge, Inc. v. 
Sullivan, 588 F. Supp. 2d 224, 237 (D.R.I. 2008) (dismissing on issue preclusion grounds a 
preemption case brought by automobile manufacturers challenging Rhode Island’s GHG 
emission standards for new automobiles, but allowing the case to continue for other nonstate 
plaintiffs); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 
398 (D. Vt. 2007) (dismissing various automobile interests’ challenge on preemption grounds to 
Vermont regulations that adopted the California motor vehicle emission standards and in so 
doing, explaining that its task was to evaluate the legitimacy of Vermont’s regulations based on 
whether they conformed to Congress’ wishes and that the significant “technical, political, and 
even moral” issues associated with the challenge of climate change were for the other branches 
of government). 
 139. The Air Conditioning, Heating & Refrigeration Inst. v. City of Albuquerque, No. 
CIV-08-633 MV/RLP, 2008 WL 5586316 (D.N.M. 2008). 
 140. Id. at *2.  
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. at *6 (quoting H.R. REP No. 100-11, at 19 (1987)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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include in every recommendation or report on proposals for 
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed 
statement by the responsible official on[] (i) the 
environmental impact of the proposed action, [and] (ii) any 
adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided 
should the proposal be implemented . . . .143  
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), through regulations 
implementing this environmental impact statement (EIS) procedure for 
federal agencies, requires agencies to consider direct effects, indirect 
effects, and cumulative impacts on the environment.144 It does not take 
much imagination to envision the NEPA climate connection and how a 
claimant would argue that an agency must include in its NEPA analysis 
an evaluation of how the proposed action, such as approval of an 
industrial source of GHG emissions, may contribute to climate change 
as a direct, indirect, or cumulative effect.145 Indeed, in doing so, NEPA 
has provided the medium for the earliest of statute-based climate change 
litigation.146 
Cases addressing NEPA compliance in the climate change context 
fell into three categories. First, over a dozen cases involved claims 
alleging that an agency improperly omitted any discussion of emissions 
and impacts from its NEPA assessment process. Another set of cases 
involved instances in which an agency had considered emissions or 
impacts, but concluded their effects were not sufficient to reach the 
“significantly affecting” threshold and thus did not warrant preparation 
of a full EIS,147 the claim being that the agency instead should have 
                                                                                                                     
 143. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006). This provision also requires statements on alternative 
actions, short- and long-term implications, and “any irreversible and irretrievable commitments 
of resources.” Id. § 4332(2)(C)(iii)–(v). 
 144. The CEQ has defined “direct effects” as those “which are caused by the action and 
occur at the same time and place,” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(a) (2011), “indirect effects” as those 
“which are caused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still 
reasonably foreseeable,” id. § 1508.8(b), and “cumulative impacts” as “the impact on the 
environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, 
present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-
Federal) or person undertakes such other actions. Cumulative impacts can result from 
individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time.” Id. 
§ 1508.7. 
 145. See generally Madeline June Kass, A NEPA-Climate Paradox: Taking Greenhouse 
Gases into Account in Threshold Significance Determinations, 42 IND. L. REV. 47, 49 (2009) 
(examining aspects of “integrating climate considerations into NEPA’s procedural framework”). 
 146. See City of Los Angeles v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 481 
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding that the city had standing to challenge the agency’s EIS for inadequate 
discussion of climate change, but ruling against the city on the merits). 
 147. In such instances, the Agency issues a “finding of no significant impact,” or FONSI, 
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done so. Lastly, a number of cases involved claims that the discussion 
of emissions or impacts in an EIS, while present, was insufficient to 
satisfy NEPA. These kinds of claims are typical of NEPA litigation,148 
so there is nothing unusual about climate change NEPA litigation in this 
sense. 
The issue in the first set of cases—whether GHG emissions and 
climate change impacts need to be considered at all under NEPA—is an 
important threshold determination for any new kind of impact. For 
climate change in particular, the extended causal chain from emissions 
to impacts and the lack of certainty in predictive impact models could 
plausibly support the argument that climate change is simply too 
speculative for agencies to need to worry about, particularly for small-
scale projects. Indeed, some courts have so ruled. For example, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that the Forest 
Service did not have to consider climate change in connection with a 
decision to thin portions of a national forest in order to control fire and 
pests.149 The court agreed with that agency that because the project 
involved a small amount of land and thinning of only some trees, its 
climate impacts were “meaningless” and thus not required to be 
mentioned at all in the NEPA analysis.150 Similarly, in a rather terse 
dismissal of a claim that federal agencies improperly omitted 
consideration of impacts of GHG emissions from vehicles using a 
proposed new highway, a federal district court emphasized the complete 
lack of evidence that the agency had considered  the emissions, but 
ruled that “[t]he plaintiffs have not, however, pointed to any law or 
regulation showing that defendants’ failure to consider greenhouse gas 
emissions makes the FIES inadequate, or makes the 
decision . . . arbitrary or capricious.”151 
In some cases, however, courts have ruled that GHG emissions and 
climate change impacts are squarely within the scope of NEPA, the 
question then being how to incorporate them into the assessment 
process. An example is Border Power Plant Working Group v. 
Department of Energy,152 in which the court held that the agency’s 
NEPA analysis for a proposed power transmission line in the United 
States should have considered the effects of GHG emissions from 
                                                                                                                     
based on a more truncated impact analysis known as an environmental assessment (EA). See 40 
C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2011). 
 148. See generally THE NEPA LITIGATION GUIDE (Karin P. Sheldon & Mark Squillace eds., 
1999). 
 149. See Hapner v. Tidwell, 621 F.3d 1239, 1245 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 150. Id. at 1245. 
 151. Sierra Club v. Fed. Hwy. Admin., 715 F. Supp. 2d 721, 741 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
 152. 260 F. Supp. 2d 997 (S.D. Cal. 2003). 
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power plants in Mexico delivering power through the line.153 The court 
rejected the agency’s arguments that the effects were too speculative 
and that because GHG emissions are unregulated, they are not within 
NEPA’s scope.154 Rather, “[b]ecause these emissions have potential 
environmental impacts and were indicated by the record, . . . failure to 
disclose and analyze their significance is counter to NEPA.”155 
This gateway issue of whether NEPA requires climate change 
analysis may be an example of how agency action is eclipsing, or at 
least influencing, the traditional judicial approach. Although the CEQ 
issued draft guidance in 1997 suggesting that NEPA “provides an 
excellent mechanism for consideration of ideas related to global climate 
change,”156 that idea went dormant and remained so, even well after the 
climate change litigation wave geared up. In a 2010 draft guidance, 
however, CEQ reprised the theme by proposing “to advise [f]ederal 
agencies to consider, in scoping their NEPA analyses, whether analysis 
of the direct and indirect GHG emissions from their proposed actions 
may provide meaningful information to decision makers and the 
public.”157 CEQ also proposed to advise agencies to consider “the 
effects of climate change on the design of a proposed action and 
alternatives.”158 Although the draft guidance recognized that low 
emission levels usually do not warrant extensive analysis and that the 
                                                                                                                     
 153. Id. at 1029. 
 154. Id. at 1028–29. 
 155. Id. at 1029. 
 156. Draft Memorandum from Kathleen A. McGinty, Chairman, Council on Envtl. Quality, 
to Heads of Federal Agencies, Guidance Regarding Consideration of Global Climatic Change in 
Environmental Documents Prepared Pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act 1 (Oct. 
8, 1997), available at http://www.boemre.gov/eppd/compliance/reports/ceqmemo.pdf. As CEQ 
explained: 
   The available scientific evidence . . . indicates that climate change is 
“reasonably foreseeable” impacts of emissions of greenhouse gases, as that 
phrase is context of NEPA and CEQ regulations. . . .  
   Specifically, federal agencies must determine whether and to what extent 
their actions affect greenhouse gases. Further, federal agencies must consider 
whether the actions they take, e.g., the planning and design of federal projects, 
may be affected by changes in the environment which might be caused by 
global climatic change. 
Id. at 4. 
 157. Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley, Chair, Council on Envtl. Quality, to Heads of 
Federal Departments and Agencies, Draft NEPA Guidance on Consideration of the Effects of 
Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Emissions 1 (Feb. 18, 2010), available at 
http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/Consideration_of_Effects_of_GHG_Draft_NEPA_Guidance_F
INAL_02182010.pdf. 
 158. Id. at 2. 
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effects of climate change are difficult to predict,159 the gist of the 
guidance was that agencies should at least put emissions and impacts 
into play in their NEPA work. Courts might view this guidance as a 
strong signal from NEPA’s chief agency that the real issue for NEPA 
and climate change is not whether emissions and impacts must be 
considered by agencies, but rather whether the agencies have prepared 
adequate assessments. At the very least, CEQ’s guidance is likely to 
prompt agencies to include emissions and impacts at some level of 
discussion in their NEPA assessments, even if to say merely that they 
were considered and rejected from effects for further analysis. This 
approach would push most NEPA climate change litigation past the 
threshold omission issue to one of the two questions of adequacy—
whether an EIS should have been prepared or, if one was prepared, 
whether the analysis is sufficiently thorough. 
On those two fronts, there is nothing unusual about the outcomes of 
the climate change NEPA cases compared to NEPA litigation involving 
other alleged effects that a proposed action could have, such as habitat 
loss or water pollution. NEPA is a highly context-specific statute, 
making it difficult to draw hard and fast rules about what must be 
considered for a proposed action and at what depth of analysis.160 So 
even though some courts have found that an agency improperly 
declined to prepare a full EIS,161 several of the decided cases have 
found the agency’s decision not to do so acceptable.162 Even more 
telling, courts have yet to find that an agency’s analysis of emissions or 
impacts in a full EIS has been inadequate. In other words, if an agency 
prepared a full EIS and put some analysis of emissions or impacts into 
it, the courts have been satisfied in every instance. This strong trend 
may reflect that courts appreciate the uncertain nature of climate change 
impact prediction. For example, one court rejected a claim that the EIS 
for a highway project inadequately assessed the GHG emission effects, 
                                                                                                                     
 159. See id. at 2–8. 
 160. This is a dominant theme of CEQ’s 2010 draft guidance, see id. at 2–10, and is true of 
NEPA impact analysis in general. See John F. Shepherd, Range of Proposals Covered by NEPA, 
in THE NEPA LITIGATION GUIDE, supra note 148, at 20, 34–38. 
 161. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Transp. Safety Admin., 508 
F.3d 508, 553–55 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the agency’s rationale for not preparing an EIS to 
analyze GHG emission impacts of proposed fuel economy standards). This is the opposite 
outcome from that reached by the D.C. Circuit on the agency’s set of fuel economy standards 
promulgated over 15 years earlier. See City of Los Angeles v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety 
Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding that the city had standing to challenge the 
agency’s EIS for inadequate discussion of climate change, but ruling against the city on the 
merits). 
 162. See, e.g., N. Slope Borough v. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., No. 3:07-cv-0045-RRB, 2008 
WL 110889, at *3–4 (D. Alaska Jan. 8, 2008) (approving of the Agency’s decision not to 
prepare a supplemental EIS to analyze effects of GHG emissions from oil and gas leasing). 
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agreeing with the agency that it was reasonable not to quantify 
emissions and calculate their impacts “because any determination 
of . . . impact on overall global climate change would have been highly 
speculative and thus not useful.”163 
The CEQ guidance, which recognizes the difficulty of predicting 
climate impacts yet encourages agencies to try, may nonetheless over 
time lead to more rigorous agency analysis and thus possibly more 
contested litigation and deeper judicial review. Thus far, however, 
NEPA has simply not provided fertile ground for plaintiffs seeking to 
force agencies to do more with their climate change assessments. A 
summary of the three kinds of NEPA claims identified and the status of 
the claims that have been filed is provided in Table II. As Table II 
shows, of the nineteen NEPA climate change matters that have reached 
some final judicial disposition, plaintiffs have prevailed in only three 
and lost on procedural grounds or on the merits in the others.164 
 
Table II: Status of NEPA Climate Change Litigation Matters 
 
NEPA Claim Total Successful Unsuccessful Other Pending 
improperly 
omitted 14 2 4 3 5 
failure to 
prepare EIS 4 1 3 0 0 
inadequate EIS 
analysis 16 0 9 3 4 
 
A more plaintiff-friendly story can be told of the cases arising under 
California’s state version of NEPA, the California Environmental 
Quality Act (CEQA),165 which imposes a similar regime for preparation 
of environmental impact review (EIR) assessments.166 California courts 
have generally made it clear that GHG emissions and climate change 
impacts are in the CEQA mix of effects that matter;167 the state has 
adopted regulatory guidelines, much like those CEQ proposed, to guide 
                                                                                                                     
 163. N. Carolina Alliance for Transp. Reform, Inc., v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 713 F. Supp. 
2d 491, 517 (M.D.N.C. 2010). 
 164. One case recorded in the “other” category was settled on terms clearly favorable to the 
plaintiff. Our focus in this particular tabulation of NEPA claim outcomes, however, is on 
judicial treatment of the NEPA claims. 
 165. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–21177 (West 2010). 
 166.  Id. § 21100. 
 167. See, e.g., Cmtys. for a Better Env’t v. City of Richmond, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 478, 491–
92 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (concluding that state legislation and policy acknowledge that GHGs 
have a significant environmental impact and requiring their consideration in CEQA analysis for 
a proposed refinery). 
48
Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss1/2
2012] AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 63 
 
agency analysis of emission and impact effects.168 From there, much 
like NEPA, the context of each proposed action has driven how far and 
deep the courts demand the agencies run with the assessment of 
emissions and impacts. Overall, however, the CEQA plaintiff win/loss 
rates are tilted more toward the win side than under NEPA. Of the 
thirty-three CEQA climate change litigation matters—like NEPA, one-
sixth of the total matters in our study—plaintiffs have prevailed on the 
merits in nine and were unsuccessful in six; five cases were resolved 
through settlement or other means, two on terms clearly favorable to the 
plaintiff, and those remaining were pending as of the close of our study 
period. 
Claims challenging agency impact assessments under state impact 
assessment statutes have been filed in only a few other states. Plaintiffs 
are zero for three in Minnesota, where the courts have, like the federal 
courts, generally deferred to agency effects analyses as adequate.169 
Matters in other states have not been resolved on the merits or are 
pending. 
Other than NEPA and its state counterparts, the ESA includes an 
impact assessment requirement that is ripe for climate change litigation. 
Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA provides that federal agencies must consult 
with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) or National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS), depending on the species, to  
insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by 
such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued 
existence of any endangered species or threatened species 
or result in the destruction or adverse modification of 
habitat of such species which is determined . . . to be 
critical.170  
The statute builds an elaborate procedure for carrying out these 
consultations under which the agency proposing the action must carry 
out a series of steps designed to predict the impact of the action on 
listed species, with the ultimate product in some instances being a 
“biological opinion” from the consulting agency “detailing how the 
agency action affects the species or its critical habitat.”171 
One recent judicial opinion makes it clear that the assessment must 
at least address the effects of climate change on the species that are the 
subject of the consultation. In Natural Resources Defense Council v. 
                                                                                                                     
 168. 14 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15064.4 (2010); see also Cal. Natural Res. Agency, 
CEQA Guidelines, CA.GOV, http://ceres.ca.gov/ceqa/guidelines (last visited Nov. 11, 2011). 
 169. See, e.g., Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Holsten, No. A08-2171, 2009 WL 
2998037, at *7–10 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2009).  
 170. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). 
 171. Id. § 1536(b)(3)(A). 
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Kempthorne,172 FWS had prepared its consultation report regarding the 
effects of the Central Valley Project-State Water Project (CVP-SWP) in 
California on a small fish, the Delta smelt.173 The biological opinion 
conclusions were based in part on the assumption that the hydrology of 
the water bodies affected by the project would follow historical patterns 
for the next twenty years.174 Undercutting this assumption, a number of 
environmental groups directed the Agency’s attention to several studies 
on the potential effects of climate change on water supply reliability, 
urging that the issue be considered in the assessment.175 FWS attempted 
to defend its failure to consider climate change at all by appealing to 
what it described as inconclusive science, but the court evidenced little 
tolerance for the Agency’s failure to address these issues openly in the 
consultation documents.176 The court found that “the climate change 
issue was not meaningfully discussed in the biological opinion, making 
it impossible to determine whether the information was rationally 
discounted because of its inconclusive nature, or arbitrarily ignored,”177 
and hence, “FWS acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to address 
the issue of climate change in the BiOp.”178 As did the majority in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, however, the Kempthorne court made it clear 
that at this stage of the litigation, “[t]here is no basis to determine what 
weight FWS should ultimately give the climate change issue in its 
analysis.”179 The Agency’s error, in other words, was in failing to 
address climate change at all.180 
Overall, however, climate change litigation brought pursuant to 
statutory monitoring, impact assessment, and disclosure requirements 
has been dominated by NEPA and CEQA claims—they make up sixty-
seven of the eighty-seven cases in the procedural monitoring, impact 
assessment, and information reporting category.181 As Figure 1 shows, 
plaintiffs have prevailed in just over a quarter of the total cases in the 
category and lost in one-third of the cases, with 30% of all matters still 
pending at the time our study period closed. All indications are that this 
                                                                                                                     
 172. 506 F. Supp. 2d 322 (E.D. Cal. 2007). 
 173. Id. at 328. 
 174. Id. at 367. 
 175. Id. at 367–68.  
 176. See id. at 369. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 370. 
 179. Id. at 370 n.28. 
 180. See also S. Yuba River Citizens League v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 723 F. Supp. 
2d 1247, 1274 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (biological opinion for operation of two dams inadequate 
because, among other defects, it did not consider the effects of global warming on river water 
temperature). 
 181. Other cases involved state impact assessment statutes other than CEQA, the ESA, or 
federal and state government and private and public information disclosure statutes. 
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category of litigation will remain active, as the trend line of annual filed 
cases shown in Figure 2 strongly suggests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II.  SIEGE WARFARE IN “PRO” VERSUS “ANTI” CLIMATE CHANGE 
LITIGATION 
Unlike the Gerrard and Howe inventory, our typology of climate 
change litigation allowed us to differentiate claims based not only on 
the plaintiff’s litigation objectives (for example, to stop government 
issuance of a permit), but also on the effect a suit’s success would have 
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on climate change law and regulation (for example, to increase 
regulatory standards). The latter parameter, built into the structure of the 
typology, allowed us to identify what we refer to as “pro” and “anti” 
cases, with “pro” cases having the objective of increasing regulation or 
liability associated with climate change and “anti” cases being aimed in 
the opposite direction.182 Although pro litigation has dominated, 
accounting for 161 of the 201 litigation matters in the study, anti 
litigation has been steadily on the rise. The result has become an 
intensely contested, broadly cast field of litigation observers have 
likened to “siege warfare”183 and a “food fight.”184 They are not far off. 
Indeed, within the substantive mitigation regulation category of 
litigation (claim types 1 through 6 in Table I), where anti litigation is 
concentrated, the thirty-three anti litigation matters account for 39% of 
the total of eighty-four matters, and the litigation filing history tracked 
in Figure 3 for anti litigation matters shows a clear upward trend. A 
summary of the outcomes of the cases in claim types 1 through 6 is 
provided in Table III. In terms of outcomes in that category, moreover, 
Table III shows that anti litigation has had at least as much traction in 
the courts as pro litigation, though neither thrust has seen much success. 
Of the fifty-one pro matters focused on substantive mitigation 
regulation issues, thirty-one have reached final resolution, with 
plaintiffs prevailing in ten cases and losing in twenty-one.185 Those 
numbers for the thirty-three total anti litigation matters are eighteen 
matters in final resolution with eight wins and ten losses for plaintiffs. 
Anti litigation, in other words, is a significant component of climate 
change litigation involving agency permits and rules, though it has gone 
largely unnoticed in legal scholarship. Also largely neglected in the 
commentary is how unsuccessful climate change litigation has been in 
general. Here, therefore, we take a closer look at the content and 
experiences of pro and anti climate change litigation. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 182. “Pro” cases are Case Types 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, and 16 in our typology 
set out on Table I.1, and “anti” cases are Case Types 2, 4, 8, 12, and 17. If a case in Case Type 
18, “other,” had a discernible pro or anti direction, we coded it appropriately. 
 183. de los Rios, supra note 47. 
 184. Elaine Spencer, Food Fight! Greenhouse Gas Regulation in 2011, GREENTECH (Jan. 
11, 2011), http://www.wagreentech.com/2011/01/food-fight-greenhouse-gas-regulation-in.html 
(noting climate policy debate is “best described as an old fashioned food fight, with parties 
hurling lawsuits and investigations and threats”). 
 185. We include in final resolution cases the relatively small number of matters that have 
settled with a clear indication that the plaintiff obtained or failed to obtain all or a substantial 
portion of the relief sought in the complaint. Settlements with no clear “winner” were coded as 
neutral and are shown in the “other” category in Table I. Because of the difficulty in tracking 
and obtaining settlement documents, we cannot claim to have identified all settled climate 
change litigation matters. 
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Table III: Outcomes of Substantive Mitigation  
Regulation Matters (Claim Types 1 through 6) 
 
Claim 
Type 
Total # 
of 
Cases 
# of Cases 
with 
Successful 
Plaintiff
# of Cases 
with 
Unsuccessful 
Plaintiff
# of Cases 
Pending 
Other 
1 (pro) 28 3 16 7 2 
2 (anti) 4 0 4 0 0 
3 (pro) 22 7 4 8 3 
4 (anti) 29 8 6 14 1 
5 (pro) 0 0 0 0 0 
6 (pro) 1 0 1 0 0 
 
One of the more glaring differences between pro and anti climate 
change litigation is their respective scopes. As can be seen from Table I, 
pro litigation is distributed among the monitoring, impact assessment, 
and reporting category (claim types 11 and 12), where it comprises all 
but one of the cases, and cases involving agency permits and approvals 
(claim type 1), agency rules and standards (claim type 3), common law 
liabilities (claim type 14), and threatened resources (claim type 16). 
Anti litigation, by contrast, is highly concentrated in the agency rules 
category (claim type 4), in which the twenty-nine matters account for 
over 80% of all the anti litigation matters in our study. 
This skewed concentration of anti litigation in the agency rules and 
standards category both explains and is explained by the filing date 
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history shown in Figure 3. Quite simply, until agencies, either on their 
own initiative or as a product of the surge of pro litigation, began 
promulgating substantive mitigation regulation rules and standards, 
there was little for anti litigation to shoot at. Consider, for example, the 
history and aftermath of Massachusetts v. EPA, covered in Subsection 
I.C.1. EPA had initially refused to grant the rulemaking petition, 
meaning that only pro litigation would be involved to move the 
agency’s position. The Supreme Court issued its opinion in 2007, 
pushing the agency into decisionmaking mode, but even then it took 
EPA until 2009 to begin proposing its massive set of rules and not until 
late 2009 did the agency promulgate any final rules.186 The pushback of 
anti litigation in response to EPA’s rules thus could not have begun 
until late 2009, and even then would be confined to the agency rules and 
standards category for some time until the permits began to be issued 
under the new rules and challenged by both pro and anti interests. The 
double spike of pro and anti filings in 2010 shown in Figure 3 thus 
suggests that anti litigation is poised to become as active and diverse as 
pro litigation, as more federal and state rules and standards come on 
line, agencies begin issuing permits, and monitoring and reporting 
regulations become more prevalent.187 
The scope and timing of pro and anti litigation matters also go a 
long way toward explaining a finding from our study that one would 
hardly have picked up by reading legal commentary on climate change 
litigation: climate change litigation, and pro litigation in particular, thus 
far has not registered much success in court. Pro litigation has been 
scattershot, exploring every potential avenue from common law to 
endangered species as a way to gain leverage on climate change policy. 
Many of the strategies seemed to have low probabilities of success from 
the start. The CAA PSD permit cases, for example, depended for any 
success on an agency or court agreeing that pollutants not regulated 
under the statute (at the time) nonetheless were required to be regulated 
in permits issued under the statute.188 Similarly, many of the NEPA pro 
matters demanded that agencies provide more detail on climate change 
impacts than seems reasonable to demand under existing scientific 
capacity.189 It should be no surprise, then, that success rates on those 
and similar claims have been low. 
For its part, anti litigation, concentrated as it is in the agency rules 
                                                                                                                     
 186. See MELTZ, supra note 3, at 1–5. 
 187. That is, of course, unless legislative initiatives preclude further agency regulatory 
initiatives, thus foreclosing pro litigation on such matters and making anti litigation 
unnecessary. New legislation forcing agencies to regulate would, of course, prompt yet more pro 
and anti litigation. 
 188. See supra Subsection I.C.1.a. 
 189. See supra Subsection I.C.2. 
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and standards category, has been reactive and necessarily focused on 
finding dents in an agency’s rulemaking process or substance. Anti 
litigation thus has relied on novel stretch claims such as constitutional 
defects (eleven matters), or on traditional uphill battles such as 
challenging rules as arbitrary and capricious (most anti cases in claim 
type 4). Even so, relative to the number of cases filed in the respective 
groups, anti litigation has been more successful than pro litigation in the 
substantive mitigation regulation category (24% success rate versus 
19.5%). And relative to cases that have reached final resolution, anti 
litigation has been substantially more successful than pro litigation 
(44% success rate versus 32%). 
One unifying theme for both thrusts is that the vast majority of 
climate change litigation—90% of all the cases in our study—has been 
advanced primarily through claims under statutes, most of which, like 
the CAA, NEPA, and the ESA, have been on the books and fodder for 
judicial interpretation for decades. These statutes have decades of built 
up jurisprudence that limits the latitude for courts to chart novel new 
interpretations favoring pro or anti climate change litigation interests. 
Even Massachusetts v. EPA, which unquestionably altered the path of 
climate change policy, was, on the merits, a rather vanilla statutory 
interpretation decision focused on the meaning of the term “air 
pollutant” in the CAA.190 
To be sure, it does not take many wins such as Massachusetts v. EPA 
to advance the pro or anti interests behind the litigation, so success rates 
do not necessarily tell the whole story of the impact of pro or anti 
litigation. One big anti win (say, success in having a new EPA rule 
nullified or casting public nuisance claims as nonjusticiable) would be a 
major story, as well. For example, after our study cutoff date, the Court 
ruled in American Electric Power v. Connecticut191 that EPA’s then-
fledgling implementation of the CAA to regulate greenhouse gases 
preempted federal common law claims alleging that major sources of 
greenhouse gases are public nuisances.  
But the aggregate effects on climate change jurisprudence of many 
“small” losses across the spectrum of pro and anti litigation can also be 
                                                                                                                     
 190. See 549 U.S. at 528–32 (majority opinion); id. at 555–60 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see 
also Kathryn A. Watts, From Chevron to Massachusetts: Justice Stevens’s Approach to 
Securing the Public Interest, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1026 (2010); Kathryn Hurie, Case 
Note, To Emit Is Human; To Regulate, Divine: Statutory Interpretation of the Clean Air Act in 
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007), 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
527, 539–45 (2009). 
  191.  131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). Noting that EPA had decided that greenhouse gases contribute 
to climate change, the Court on this occasion opened its decision with a reference to a well-
known climate change “skeptic” and the caveat that “the Court, we caution, endorses no 
particular view of the complicated issues related to carbon-dioxide emissions and climate 
change.” Id. at 2533 n.2.   
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profound. NEPA litigation, for example, has treated climate change just 
like any other issue—most courts say agencies should consider 
significant GHG emissions and climate change impacts in their NEPA 
process, but the courts (and CEQ) have devised no special rules for 
scope and depth of analysis. Although no one of these cases may be 
headline worthy, the aggregate effect can be to build up a general 
jurisprudential practice. It is this backdrop of pro and anti litigation 
losses under existing statutes that largely has been ignored in 
commentary on climate change litigation and which could only have 
been revealed through a comprehensive empirical study. Having shed 
light on it and the other specific findings of our study, we now turn to 
drawing some broader empirical and normative conclusions. 
III.  EMPIRICAL AND NORMATIVE THEMES 
Parts I and II of this Article delved into the details of climate change 
litigation at levels of scope and detail never before explored in legal 
commentary. As discussed in the Introduction, our reason for getting to 
this point has been to provide the foundation for informed and reasoned 
approaches to a number of empirically and normatively oriented 
questions about climate change litigation. The Sections that follow offer 
what we believe our study indicates those foundations to be. 
A.  The Judicial Action on Climate Change: How Much, Where, and 
Who’s Playing? 
Our study has caught climate change litigation at what is likely a 
turning point in many respects. On the one hand, with 201 matters, a 
growing number of which have been resolved through judicial decision 
or settlement, climate change litigation surely is “up and running” in the 
courts, with no indication of dying out. On the other hand, its 
composition is likely to diversify, and its pro versus anti siege-warfare 
component is likely to intensify. As noted above, EPA and other 
agencies are just now promulgating rules, and anti litigation is likely to 
surge as the new rules come on line and permits are issued. As climate 
change progresses, moreover, more threatened resources are likely to 
prompt more robust litigation in that category, and the rights and 
liabilities and adaptation categories are likely to come on line as well. 
Of course, just as predictive models of climate change impacts are 
unreliable, so too are any predictions of future climate change policies. 
New legislation or a new Supreme Court decision could quickly unleash 
or corral climate change litigation on any or all fronts.192 Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                                     
 192. One ongoing debate in legal scholarship, for example, is whether the Clean Air Act is 
an appropriate vehicle for climate change emissions regulation and whether Congress should 
enact legislation limiting its application. Compare Teresa B. Clemmer, Staving Off the Climate 
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the time is ripe for taking stock of the climate change litigation scene. 
We do so in this Section to gain a macro sense of its trend, locus, and 
participants at this important juncture. 
1.  How Much Action Is There in the Court System? 
One of the ironies of legal commentary on climate change litigation is 
that the predicted “wave” of litigation, if one can call it that, has already 
hit, but not for the reasons generally given. The predictions of massive 
volumes of litigation have largely focused on the small cohort of public 
nuisance cases, one of which surely could burst through to a full trial 
and make a splash if the plaintiffs prevail. Yet as Figure 4 shows, the 
wave of climate change litigation already hit in 2007 and has been 
rolling steadily along ever since. Its continued force is based on the 
pro/anti battle in the substantive mitigation regulation cases and the 
impact assessment claims brought under NEPA and CEQA. Actual hard 
law to apply in the form of resolved matters has built steadily as well, to 
the point that in 2010, more cases were resolved than were newly filed. 
And as Figure 5 shows, most of the action is in federal and state courts, 
in which 89% of the matters are pending or resolved. With 144 resolved 
pieces of litigation and 57 pending in courts and agencies around the 
nation as of the closing date of our study, it is our impression that 
climate change litigation is not just coming—it is here, and the courts 
are where the action is.193 
                                                                                                                     
Crisis: The Sectoral Approach Under the Clean Air Act, 40 ENVTL. L. 1125, 1127 (2010) 
(arguing for using the Clean Air Act and against preemptive legislation), with Craig N. Oren, Is 
the Clean Air Act at a Crossroads?, 40 ENVTL L. 1231, 1232 (2010) (arguing that the Clean Air 
Act is a poor GHG emissions regulation mechanism). 
 193. To be sure, agency adjudication is likely to become more popular as the business of 
permit issuance becomes more active, and facial rules challenges are likely to be a diminishing 
percentage of the litigation as climate change regulation matures. But more agency permit 
adjudication will likely lead to more claims for judicial review by courts. 
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2.  Where Is the Litigation Action Hot and Cold? 
At this stage of climate change litigation, equally apparent as the 
tribunal focus of the claims is where the claim focus is hot and cold. As 
Figure 6 shows, in 2009 and 2010, cases were filed in only eight of our 
eighteen claim types. Pro litigation in the monitoring, impact 
assessment, and reporting category (claim type 11) dominated in both 
years, with 50% in 2009 and 40% in 2010. Its only real competition 
came from cases challenging agency rules and standards (claim types 3 
and 4), which combined accounted for 27% in 2009 and 40% in 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The spike of filings in these two groupings of claim types supports 
our earlier predictions that climate change litigation, barring game-
changing new legislation with preemptive effects, is likely to bulge 
around pro and anti claims under existing federal and state statutes to 
challenge agency action. The other two categories with some presence 
in 2009 through 2010 filings—claims challenging agency permits 
(claim type 1) and claims involving identification of threatened 
resources (claim type 16)—also seem likely to remain fueled by 
continued pro litigation filings: more permits will be issued as new 
regulations take hold, and more species and habitats will be threatened 
as climate change gains traction at landscape levels. The question, 
therefore, is not whether these forms of climate change litigation will 
surge forward—they will unless new legislation stops them—but rather 
which other categories of litigation unrepresented thus far in the mix of 
filings will increase. We anticipate a significant volume of enforcement 
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cases over time, both those brought by government and citizen suits, in 
addition to rights and liabilities cases and adaptation suits. 
3.  Who Are the Players and What Is Their Game? 
As for who is making the action, the story is largely what would be 
expected from the weight of where the action is—private plaintiffs are 
suing government defendants. A summary of the parties involved in 
climate change litigation by category is provided in Table IV. As Table 
IV shows, the most litigious plaintiffs by far are environmental NGOs 
followed far behind by industry NGOs and companies. The primary 
targets for all three have been federal and state governments, though 
environmental NGOs also include companies as defendants frequently. 
Of course, the fact that agency permits, rules, and impact assessments 
make up the substance of the vast majority of climate change litigation 
matters explains why the federal and state governments are in the bull’s 
eye of NGO and corporate plaintiff litigation claims. 
 
Table IV: Parties in Climate Change Litigation 
 
Category Party Fed. State Local Tribe Env. NGO 
Ind. 
NGO Co P 
substantive  
(1–10) 
Pl. 0 15 4 0 51 18 19 6 
Def. 42 34 9 0 0 0 17 0 
assessment 
(11–12) 
Pl. 0 4 5 5 76 6 3 4 
Def. 48 27 19 0 0 0 21 0 
rights 
(13–15) 
Pl. 0 3 1 0 3 1 3 2 
Def. 4 2 1 0 0 0 6 0 
resources 
(16–17) 
Pl. 0 0 0 0 11 2 0 0 
Def. 12 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
other 
(18) 
Pl. 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 
Def. 0 4 1 0 0 0 1 0 
totals 
Pl. 0 22 10 5 141 27 27 14 
Def. 106 68 30 0 0 0 45 0 
All 106 90 40 5 141 27 72 14 
 
What Table IV does not reveal is what is behind the state, local, and 
tribal government plaintiff action. Who are they suing? We were 
surprised to find that in all cases in which a state, local, or tribal 
government was among the plaintiffs, another governmental entity was 
the target defendant. Massachusetts v. EPA was not the anomaly, but 
the rule. Indeed, all but one of the fifteen cases involving a state 
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government as plaintiff had the federal government as a defendant; the 
defendant in the other case was a local government. Also, states line up 
on both sides of the pro versus anti battle—eight of the state plaintiff 
cases were pro litigation and seven were anti. The same is true for the 
four local government plaintiff cases; all of them had the federal 
government as a defendant, three times in pro litigation and once in anti 
litigation. All five tribal plaintiff suits were pro litigation against the 
federal government, with one also having a state government defendant. 
Intergovernmental litigation is by no means unusual in 
environmental law194 or other fields195—governments can and do sue 
other governments—but it was striking to us to find that all climate 
change litigation through 2010 involving a government entity as a 
plaintiff involved a government entity, usually the federal government, 
as a defendant. Professor Hari Osofsky has suggested that climate 
change is fundamentally a multiscalar governance challenge and that 
intergovernmental litigation is a medium in which to “debate the 
appropriateness and necessity of regulatory entities at different scales 
taking particular steps to address global climate change.”196 Our 
findings suggest that she is on point and that governments have turned 
to litigation as a means of resolving governance scale disputes that are 
not being managed effectively through legislative institutions. To be 
sure, as federal and state agencies issue GHG emission permits and 
promulgate emission standards under existing and new legislation, 
government enforcement activity against private actors is likely to 
increase (as are citizen suits). But with no clear agenda coming out of 
Congress for what is federal and what is state in climate policy,197 we 
anticipate intergovernmental litigation to serve as the medium for 
resolving many of the federalism issues pervading climate change 
                                                                                                                     
 194. See, e.g., Keith Laing, Florida to Challenge Federal Water Standards, DAILY REC. 
(Jacksonville), Dec. 8, 2010, available at http://www.jaxdailyrecord.com/showstory.php?Story_ 
id=532463. 
 195. See, e.g., M. Scott Carter, AG Files Suit, Making Oklahoma 28th State to Challenge 
Health Care Law, J. REC. LEGIS. REP. (Oklahoma City, Okla.), Jan. 24, 2011, available at 
EBSCOhost, Accession No. L54668554JROL. 
 196. Hari M. Osofsky, The Continuing Importance of Climate Change Litigation, 1 
CLIMATE L. 3, 15 (2010); see also Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP 
Deewater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1077, 1119 (2011) (“[S]cale forms a critical 
element of the governance complexities; . . . reform proposals consistently call for better 
inclusion of smaller scales in the top-down federal structure that dominates regulation . . . .”). 
 197. See Robert L. Glicksman, Climate Change Adaptation: A Collective Action 
Perspective on Federalism Considerations, 40 ENVTL. L. 1159, 1163 (2010) (“Despite the 
critical need for the development of adaptive responses to climate change, the federal 
government has done little to stake out its turf on adaptation policy or to coordinate the 
responses of lower levels of government.”); Ruhl, supra note 34, at 412 (“[T]he United States 
has compiled close to zero in the way of coordinated anticipatory adaptation policy for 
managing the risk in the United States of climate change catastrophe and crisis.”). 
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policies. 
B.  The Impact of the Courts on Climate Change Policy: Lessons to 
Date and Areas for Further Research 
While climate change is a new issue that presents what may be 
many novel policy questions, an outstanding question involves the 
extent to which it has proved exceptional in spawning novel policy 
responses.198 In jurisprudence, at least, thus far it has not been treated as 
exceptional. Whether climate change policy demands a new policy 
model for legislatures, for the most part, it is being channeled in the 
courts through a set of stale environmental laws and old common law 
doctrines, each of which has decades of its own judicial baggage. While 
we did not attempt to judge qualitatively how “far out there” a particular 
litigant’s claim may have asked a court to depart from the settled 
jurisprudence of these statutes and doctrines, it is our sense from 
cohorts of matters such as the CAA, NEPA, and CEQA cases that 
however far it was, in most cases it was too far for the court to take the 
leap. Climate change may be an exceptional problem for other 
institutions, but for the courts it has generally been business as usual. In 
this Section, we elaborate on that conclusion and identify some future 
fruitful research opportunities that could build on the empirical work we 
have done. 
1.  How Have Courts Responded as Agencies Address (or Decline to 
Address) Climate Change Through Discrete Regulatory Initiatives and 
Adjudicatory Decisions? 
While it may have involved only a mundane application of statutory 
interpretation doctrine to decide the merits, gateway cases such as 
Massachusetts v. EPA, where a court’s decision either catalyzes or 
closes the door to agency regulation, are one test for climate 
exceptionalism in the courts. Massachusetts v. EPA forced open the 
door to agency regulation and triggered a cascade of agency rulemaking 
and judicial litigation. It is likely for this reason that the case has been 
deemed exceptional by at least one audience that watches climate 
change litigation closely—environmental lawyers. Respondents to a 
2010 survey of environmental law practitioners and academics asking 
about the most important environmental law cases overwhelmingly 
characterized Massachusetts v. EPA as the most significant 
environmental law decision of all time.199 Moreover, while some 
                                                                                                                     
 198. For a thoughtful overview of this question, see generally John Copeland Nagle, 
Climate Exceptionalism, 40 ENVTL. L. 53 (2010). 
 199. See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Who’s Number One?, ENVTL. F., Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 
36, 37. 
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consider Massachusetts v. EPA to be a traditional, narrow case of 
statutory interpretation, some, including the dissent, characterize it as 
exceptional for its standing analysis.200 
Beyond Massachusetts v. EPA, however, the bottom line from our 
empirical study is that some pro climate change litigation challenging a 
discrete agency decision on permits and rules is successful at achieving 
its objective and some is not, some anti litigation is successful and some 
is not, and it is difficult to construct a story about the jurisprudential 
attitude other than it appears to involve nothing new or novel. It would 
be an unjustified stretch to suggest that there is some coherent pattern to 
the outcome and aftermath of climate change litigation that elevates 
climate change to any special jurisprudential status. If anything, a fair 
and complete reading of the case law on climate change tells a story of 
courts applying existing laws consistent with their settled 
interpretations, rather than embedding a new jurisprudence of climate 
change within the existing statutory frameworks. 
2.  To What Extent Have Courts Crafted a Distinct Climate Change 
Jurisprudence? 
Stepping back from the statistics, when one reads all of the judicial 
opinions issued in climate change litigation matters, which we did, does 
anything in the form of a distinct jurisprudence of climate change 
materialize from the litigation fog? No. Our assessment is that, at this 
point at least, climate change litigation looks about the same as 
litigation over any other regulatory question that has ground its way 
through the courts. Nothing about adding climate change into the mix 
has appeared to trigger judicial responses leading to anything distinctly 
or exceptionally “climate change” in quality. In terms of actual 
litigation outcomes and aftermaths and of judicial tone and 
temperament, climate change in the courts has been a story of business 
as usual. 
To begin with, there is nothing in the record of climate change 
jurisprudence that in any way sets climate change litigation aside as a 
special case warranting new judge-made law. As we have reviewed 
above in Section I.C and Part II, courts have not forged any new law of 
the CAA, NEPA, ESA, CEQA, or the other statutes that have been 
fodder for climate change litigation, and they have yet to even reach a 
common law claim on the merits. No court has stood up to say, “The 
legislature and agencies have dropped the ball, and the courts must now 
                                                                                                                     
 200. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535–36 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see 
also, e.g., Stephen M. Johnson, The Roberts Court and the Environment, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 317, 335 (2010) (noting that “[i]n Massachusetts v. EPA, for instance, the Court created 
generous standing rules for States”). 
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make climate change law!” Legal scholars could debate at length 
whether the courts should do so, a question we do not purport to address 
here. For our purposes, we can safely report that the reality is that the 
courts have not done so. 
More deeply, this is not the same as saying courts do not think 
climate change is important. Many do and say so. Massachusetts v. 
EPA, for example, contains rhetorical flourishes to that effect.201 But in 
the end, the case was about routine statutory interpretation. On the 
merits of whether EPA has authority to regulate GHGs under the CAA, 
the majority approached the statutory interpretation question with 
sterile, narrowly confined precision, devoid of commentary on climate 
change. 
Climate change litigation is still in its early stages, however, and it 
is quite possible that future case law will include exceptional 
approaches or outcomes. Given the dynamic quality of the attention 
being paid to climate change throughout government, it is impossible to 
predict when and where the courts will be called in to referee or provide 
direction. With this caveat, it strikes us that the following three 
significant climate change issue arenas are among those that may bear 
watching for the opportunities they may provide for exceptional 
approaches and outcomes. First, the “square peg, round hole” challenge 
of addressing climate change under the CAA suggests that EPA is likely 
to need to apply the CAA creatively to make it workable. This need for 
extreme agency creativity has already manifested itself in the Agency’s 
Tailoring Rule, in which EPA straightforwardly acknowledged that its 
regulatory scheme for stationary sources of GHG emissions departs 
from the approach embodied in the text of the CAA.202 While EPA has 
invoked long-established canons of statutory construction to justify this 
disconnect,203 treatment of this issue may require special care by the 
judiciary, given the significant gap between legislative direction and 
agency capacity that provides the context for its decisionmaking. 
Next, advocates on both sides of the nuisance cases are already 
arguing aggressively that the courts’ treatment of these cases has the 
potential to be exceptional, in terms of whether it allows the cases to be 
heard on the merits and if it reaches them, how it addresses the merits. 
In a forthcoming article, Professor Douglas Kysar argues, for example, 
that it would be a radical break from precedent to disallow nuisance 
                                                                                                                     
 201. But these pronouncements all played into the majority’s opinion on the question 
whether the plaintiffs had standing. See 549 U.S. at 519–26 (majority opinion). 
 202. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71). 
 203. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
75 Fed. Reg. at 31,533. 
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cases on justiciability grounds.204 On the other hand, Professor Laurence 
Tribe refers to the “incompatibility of climate change and nuisance 
doctrine” and argues that “worldwide climate change is a systemic 
phenomenon that is intractable to anything but a systemic political 
solution, one that the adversarial and insulated model of nuisance 
litigation is structurally incapable of providing.”205 The Supreme 
Court’s decision that EPA’s emerging regulation of GHG emissions 
preempts federal common law claims only complicates this debate—it 
leaves open the questions of what happens if EPA reverses course and 
what effect EPA’s regulatory position has on state common law 
claims.206 
Finally, some of the challenges associated with climate change have 
stirred up strong discord between EPA and the states. It remains to be 
seen how this will work out. The courts have found themselves in the 
position, on many occasions, of resolving disputes between EPA and 
the states, and determining how authority under a cooperative 
federalism system should be allocated.207 There have been few 
circumstances, however, in which EPA has withdrawn federal 
authorization of a state program, as it recently proposed for part of 
Texas’s CAA permitting program.208 In the particular context of the 
CAA, there similarly have been very few instances in which EPA has 
felt compelled to issue a Federal Implementation Plan because a State 
was not prepared to implement a new permitting program, as EPA 
recently has done for several states because of their lack of preparedness 
to implement the PSD program for GHG emissions.209 
                                                                                                                     
 204. Ewing & Kysar, supra note 11, at 49. 
 205. Laurence H. Tribe, Joshua D. Branson & Tristan L. Duncan, Too Hot for Courts to 
Handle: Fuel Temperatures, Global Warming, and the Political Question Doctrine 15–16 
(Wash. Legal Found., Critical Legal Issues Working Paper No. 169, 2010), available at 
http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/workingpaper/012910Tribe_WP.pdf. 
 206.  See Am. Elec. Power, Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
 207. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 215–16 (D.C. Cir 1988) 
(approving EPA’s regulations for authorizing states to implement the Clean Water Act NPDES 
program). 
 208. Texas v. EPA, No. 10-1425 (D.C. Cir. filed Dec. 30, 2010); Texas v. EPA, No. 10-
60614 (5th Cir. filed July 26, 2010); see also Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality 
Implementation Plans; Maryland; Transportation Conformity Regulations; Withdrawal of 
Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,627 (Aug. 11, 2010) (withdrawing EPA’s approval of 
Maryland’s SIP). For discussions of the limited number of times EPA has withdrawn 
authorization, see, e.g., ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, 
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 953–54 (5th ed. 2006); CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, 
REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 329–35 
(2003). 
 209. Action to Ensure Authority to Issue Permits Under the Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration Program to Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Finding of Failure to Submit 
State Implementation Plan Revisions Required for Greenhouse Gases, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,874 
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Our suggestion above in connection with the courts’ role in 
assessing EPA’s emerging regulatory scheme for addressing GHG 
emissions holds equally true here. Increasing workloads during a time 
of diminishing resources is a recipe for turbulent times for our 
cooperative federalism approach to regulation under the CAA. The 
courts may well find themselves in the middle of a difficult debate 
about allocation of responsibility for implementation of the CAA as 
capacity to meet legislative demands falls far short of the minimum 
needed to conform to the congressional design. The courts have faced 
such challenges before,210 but may need to consider a broad range of 
rarely used canons of construction in directing how this gap between 
rhetoric and reality should be closed. 
3.  To What Extent Have Courts Prompted or Forced Legislative or 
Administrative Attention to Climate Change Policy? 
If there were anything to the idea of climate change litigation 
jurisprudence exceptionalism, one would expect it to have registered in 
other institutions, agencies and legislatures. To be sure, some climate 
change pro litigation matters can reasonably be placed in the chain of 
causation leading to administrative agency action. Most famously, after 
a history of EPA vacillation on the question whether it has the authority 
to regulate emissions under the CAA,211 the Supreme Court in 
Massachusetts v. EPA decided it does, and seemingly inexorably pushed 
the agency in the direction of regulating.212 Still, putting aside its 
                                                                                                                     
(Dec. 29, 2010) (finding that PSD permitting requirements in thirteen states do not meet CAA 
requirements because their programs do not cover GHG emissions). 
 210. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(rejecting EPA’s argument that it could exempt farms from water pollution laws because of the 
“administrative infeasibility” of issuing and administering millions of permits). 
 211. See Cannon, supra note 3, at 53–54 (former EPA General Counsel describes the 
agency history leading up to the litigation). 
 212. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). Having found that greenhouse gas emissions are pollutants 
under the Clean Air Act, the Court observed that the statute charges EPA with regulating 
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles if, in EPA’s “judgment[, the emissions] cause, or 
contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or 
welfare.” Id. at 528 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Noting that the statute defines “welfare” to include “effects on . . . weather . . . and climate,” the 
Court rejected all of EPA’s proffered bases for its judgment not to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions. Id. at 506 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, 
the Court concluded, under the clear terms of the statute, EPA can avoid taking further action to 
regulate carbon emissions from motor vehicles “only if it determines that greenhouse gases do 
not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it 
cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do.” Id. at 533 (citation 
omitted). As its only example of a “reasonable explanation,” the Court suggested that EPA 
might find “the scientific uncertainty is so profound that it precludes EPA from making a 
reasoned judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to global warming.” Id. at 534. 
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controversial standing analysis, some scholars consider the case a 
resounding judicial rejection of climate exceptionalism in terms of how 
existing statutes are to be applied, as the Court employed basic statutory 
interpretation canons to conclude that a traditional pollution control 
statute covers GHG emissions.213 
Whether endorsing exceptionalism or not, there are no other cases 
like Massachusetts v. EPA in which a court has so overtly nudged an 
agency toward a cascade of regulation, much less commanded it. 
Rather, some successful pro litigation efforts seem, at most, to have 
encouraged agency action or weakened agency resistance to regulate, 
though it is difficult to trace these effects in any direct sense. For 
example, the courts did not demand that CEQ issue its guidance on how 
to address climate change in NEPA analyses,214 nor must CEQ issue 
such guidance for the courts to demand that agencies include climate 
change in environmental assessments under some conditions. After all, 
CEQ had thought of including climate change in NEPA analyses in 
1997, well before courts got involved, and courts had thought of 
requiring integration of climate change in NEPA analyses well before 
CEQ followed through on its initial concepts in its 2010 guidance. So it 
is difficult to say whether the courts prompted, facilitated, or provided 
cover for CEQ’s 2010 guidance; perhaps it was simply all about 
politics, and the change in administrations would have led to agency 
action regardless of judicial action. Both the 1997 and 2010 draft 
guidances, after all, were issued under Democratic administrations, with 
silence on the issue from the intervening Republican administration. 
Indeed, a slate of recent settlements of pro litigation against the 
federal government suggests that politics and change in administration 
have much to do with how litigation plays into administrative action. To 
put it bluntly, of twenty matters we identified as settled on terms 
favorable to the plaintiff since the beginning of climate change 
litigation, eleven were pro litigation matters against the federal 
government settled after the Obama Administration took office.215 This 
                                                                                                                     
The Court thus left EPA little wiggle room, though it noted that “[w]e need not and do not reach 
the question whether on remand EPA must make an endangerment finding, or whether policy 
concerns can inform EPA’s actions in the event that it makes such a finding.” Id. at 534–35. 
 213. See Nagle, supra note 198, at 54 (“The Court thus rejected . . . ‘climate 
exceptionalism’—the belief that the problem presented by climate change is different from the 
air pollution problems that we have addressed in the past.”). 
 214. See supra text accompanying notes 159–63. 
 215. Again, we must caution that we cannot assure that we identified all settled cases, and 
that some judgment was involved in assessing whether the plaintiff prevailed through 
settlement. Several cases against the federal agencies involving missed decision deadlines—for 
example, failure to promulgate a rule by a statutorily mandated date—were settled on terms 
requiring the agency to meet a deadline. Although in this sense the plaintiff prevailed, we 
counted the outcome as neutral if the agency committed to no substantive decision. Our 
67
Markell and Ruhl: An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change In The Courts: A New Ju
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
82 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
experience, however, is by no means unique to climate change, as 
changes in presidential administrations have frequently led to settlement 
of litigation filed antagonistically against the prior administration or as 
friendly litigation against the incoming administration.216 
Another problem with chalking up the pro litigation wave as having 
been a causal agent in broadly pushing administrative action on climate 
change toward regulation is that anti litigation must also be taken into 
account. Courts in the successful anti cases have directly and overtly 
snuffed regulatory change that would have ramped up substantive 
mitigation regulation and more rigorous impact assessment 
requirements. As discussed in Part II, anti litigation has had at least as 
much success as pro litigation, and neither has had resounding success 
rates in any case. Overall, therefore, the impact of climate change 
litigation on agency action has likely been moderate at best, and even at 
that has been a two-way street. 
4.  What Has Been the Overall Impact of Climate Change Litigation on 
the Institutional Structures of the Administrative State? 
To say that climate change litigation has not mandated that other 
branches act is different from concluding that its impact on other 
institutions has been insignificant. Clearly, had the Court in 
Massachusetts v. EPA ruled that GHG emissions are not subject to CAA 
regulation, Congress and EPA would have been on different paths than 
the ones taken. Similarly, the host of cases involving the applicability of 
PSD and BACT regulation to emissions of GHG cases led EPA to 
promulgate a rule that resolved this question.217 
Beyond these relatively direct judicial interventions, there is some 
evidence that courts have tried to prod agencies and Congress to act.  In 
a forthcoming article, Professor Douglas Kysar and attorney Benjamin 
Ewing stress the value of this judicial function, arguing that “[i]n the 
way that checks and balances correct against the tyrannical 
overreaching of any particular branch of government, prods and pleas 
[by the court system] counteract the oppressive underreaching of 
government institutions.”218 There is evidence that the courts have 
sought to have this type of influence. By exercising judicial restraint 
and declining to act in an exceptional way themselves, courts have 
prodded the other branches to act. As the South Dakota Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                     
rationale was that the settlement established no climate change law, but rather only forced an 
agency to make a decision about climate change law. Several additional settlements made after 
the beginning of the Obama Administration fall in this category. 
 216. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The 
Public Interest in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DUKE L.J. 1015, 1017 (2001). 
 217. See supra note 61. 
 218. Ewing & Kysar, supra note 11, at 11. 
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suggested in refusing to overturn the Public Utility Commission’s 
(PUC) issuance of a power plant permit: 
Global warming presents a momentous and complex 
threat to our planet. A resolution for this problem, critical 
though it is, cannot be made in the isolation of judicial 
proceedings. The social, economic, and environmental 
consequences of global warming implicate policy decisions 
constitutionally reserved for the executive and legislative 
branches. . . . 
As members of the judiciary, we refrain from settling 
policy questions more properly left for the Governor, the 
Legislature, and Congress. No matter how grave our 
concerns on global warming, we cannot allow personal 
views to impair our role under the Constitution. In South 
Dakota, the Legislature designated the PUC as the 
responsible agency for this question of granting a permit.219 
Thus, our study provides some evidence that courts are performing this 
“prods and pleas” function in the climate change arena.  
Assessing the effectiveness of this prodding and pleading, however, 
is another matter. Our empirical study has focused on the action of the 
courts and in that sense only goes so far. There is the remaining 
challenge of connecting the dots between climate change litigation and 
responses by agencies and the legislature. This strikes us as an 
important area for future research. For example, where is the evidence 
that Congress or state and local legislatures have paid any attention to 
the courts on matters of legislative climate change policy? Superficially, 
it appears that while many members of Congress have probably paid 
attention to the ramifications of EPA’s rule promulgations that 
Massachusetts v. EPA nudged into motion, Congress has done nothing 
about it either way. Legislation has been introduced in response to the 
case to remove GHGs from the scope of the CAA,220 but there has not 
yet been any explicit congressional endorsement or override of the 
Court’s opinion. The same is true with respect to congressional 
                                                                                                                     
 219. In re Otter Tail Power Co., 744 N.W.2d 594, 603 (S.D. 2008). See also Green 
Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 398 (D. Vt. 2007) 
(highlighting the importance of legislative and regulatory action to address climate change while 
declining to address various issues itself, the court noted: “This Court’s task is to determine 
whether the plaintiffs have carried their burden to show that Vermont’s GHG regulation stands 
as an obstacle to the objectives of Congress. Many of the technical, political and even moral 
issues raised by this case are not, and should not be, resolved here, but may remain the subject 
of debate and policy-making in Congress, in state legislatures, and in federal and state 
agencies.”). 
 220. See Save Our Energy Jobs Act, H.R. 4396, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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responses to court decisions on climate change issues under the ESA, 
NEPA, and all the other federal statutes covered in the cases in our 
survey—Congress has been inert in response. A natural follow-up to our 
research on the action in the courts would be a thorough review of the 
legislative responses to this activity, including consideration of the 
impact of the judicial activity we have described and other factors on 
legislative efforts. 
IV.  SPECULATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 
We were surprised by what our study revealed about the past and 
present of climate change litigation, so we are cautious in making 
predictions about its future and in suggesting what scholars might 
devote to climate change research. Nevertheless, we formed a strong 
impression that climate change litigation is a highly active and dynamic 
field about to take on new dimensions and magnitudes. And as we have 
the advantage, in retrospect (having read and analyzed every climate 
change matter, 201 in all, plus over 100 we excluded from the study), 
we do feel at least somewhat equipped to offer informed speculation 
about such matters. In this Part, we ask your indulgence in allowing us 
the liberty to do so. 
As the discussion above unfolded, we noted seeming trends and how 
they might influence the future of climate change litigation. Although 
extrapolation from trends is dangerous in such a dynamic environment, 
we feel confident in making several predictions. First, unless derailed 
by preemptive litigation, regulatory developments under the Clean Air 
Act will trigger rounds of federal and state permitting, which will fuel a 
surge of pro and anti litigation in our permits and approvals categories 
(claim types 1 and 2). Second, anti litigation in general is likely to grow 
in magnitude and widen in scope as more federal and state agencies 
promulgate rules and engage in discrete decisions. This will be true not 
only for substantive mitigation regulation, but also for monitoring, 
impact assessment, and reporting procedures, and it will lead to industry 
NGOs and companies taking a larger share of the plaintiff side of 
litigation. Third, although intergovernmental litigation is likely to 
continue for as long as Congress remains silent on its federalism vision 
for climate policy, government enforcement of the newly minted 
standards and permits will put federal agencies finally on the plaintiff 
side of litigation, as well as broaden state governments into that role. 
We further expect the citizen suit component of pro litigation to expand 
dramatically, as permits are issued, compliance issues arise, and citizens 
initiate legal actions to complement government enforcement. 
So far we have limited predictions to extrapolating from trends 
revealed in our study. Our study results also show, however, that while 
climate change litigation is broader in scope than has been covered in 
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legal scholarship, it has yet to encompass all that fits under climate 
change policy. For example, given the growing sense that the country 
faces very significant economic, social, and environmental adaptation 
challenges because of climate change, we wanted to explore the 
potential for and experience of public and private adaptation litigation. 
The same was true for our rights and liabilities categories, which 
encompass claims about civil rights, contract disputes, business losses, 
and so on. We wondered about the role of the courts to date in grappling 
with these challenges—to what extent have adaptation issues found 
their way to the courts, including not only through administrative 
actions but also in disputes over civil rights and economic relations. Yet 
we found very little of such litigation. 
Nonetheless, it strikes us as inevitable that climate change litigation 
will soon creep into these yet-unrepresented claim categories. As inert 
as Congress has been on the mitigation legislation front, we see little 
prospect of it taking the bull by the horns on the adaptation and rights 
and liabilities fronts anytime soon. And in any event, courts will 
necessarily be the arbiters of contract disputes, civil rights claims, and 
other claims traditionally in the domain of the courts. Indeed, for that 
reason, it is here that courts may begin to forge a special jurisprudence 
for climate change, although they have not for regulatory claims. 
Finally, we anticipate that before long, it will make sense to refer to 
climate change law for some statutes as being established and 
reasonably settled through the aggregation of judicial opinions. The 
courts and agencies have been busy, resolving 110 litigation matters in 
2008–10, meaning it is possible for lawyers to research and synthesize 
bodies of case law. For example, there already is a fairly well defined 
case law under NEPA and CEQA establishing that GHG emissions and 
climate change impacts are fair game for impact assessment procedures, 
but that the normal rules apply for determining the level of analysis 
agencies must provide. While litigation under the CAA is about to enter 
a new phase and will be rocky for several years as EPA rolls out its 
rules, it too may stabilize into a coherent case law sooner than might be 
expected. The law of climate change, for long only a prospect, is now 
on the books in large part due to litigation. Its judicial contribution may 
not be an example of exceptionalism at work, but even business as usual 
in the courts has made for substantial development of climate change 
law. That is not likely to change anytime soon. 
CONCLUSION 
The story of climate change in the courts has not been one of 
forging a new jurisprudence, but rather one of operating under business 
as usual. It is also not the story one would pick up from media coverage 
or from legal scholarship, both of which have honed in on fewer than a 
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dozen of the 201 matters we classify as climate change litigation. The 
real story, in other words, is to be found in the other 190-plus cases that 
are winding or have wound their way through agency and judicial 
forums. That story is one of pro and anti interests locking horns with 
agencies in litigation concentrated under a few federal statutes, grinding 
away at fairly narrow factual and legal issues. Many unglamorous cases 
have been filed and decided, failing to get into the headlines. But the 
result is that the aggregate effect of all those “unimportant” cases has 
been lost in the commentary, completely crowded out by predictions of 
waves of common law nuisance claims and the next “big” regulatory 
case. The fact is that there have been few common law cases, none 
reaching the merits, and few “big” cases like Massachusetts v. EPA and 
American Electric Power v. Connecticut, while there have been scores 
of cases building up a case law under a variety of statutes. 
One can tell the story of those cases, however, only if one looks for 
it, which is what our study was intended to do. Perhaps our big picture 
conclusion—that the courts have treated climate change as business as 
usual—is itself also not a hot story. But it should be. It speaks volumes 
about the judiciary and about litigation as institutions in our governance 
system. We hope, now that the story is out, it will lead scholars and 
commentators to broaden the focus of the questions they ask of climate 
change litigation and to refine the conclusions they draw. 
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